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Joseph Schlesinger in his seminal work Ambition and Politics: Political 
Careers in the United States defined the particular types of ambition that determined 
which politicians ran for what level of political office. In building out Schlesinger’s 
typology to include the innovative concept of hyper progressive ambition, this paper 
seeks to answer Schlesinger’s unasked question of just how progressively ambitious 
politicians would achieve their goals once elected to office.  The campaigns, 
presidential transitions and early administrations of presidents John F. Kennedy and 
Barack H. Obama are examined to identify the characteristics of the hyper progressive 
candidate-turned-president and determine what safeguards such candidates should take 
to best position themselves for a successful administration.   
 The paper will describe the foundations of progressive ambition theory as termed 
by Arthur Schlesinger in his seminal work "Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in 
the United States", then identify the theory's failure to explain 'how' politicians run for 
higher office. It will explore selected data tests to demonstrate via quantitative data and 
examples from qualitative research how candidates-turned-leaders Kennedy and Obama 
actuated their hyper progressive ambitious abilities and stratagems. Synthesized from 
this paper’s findings, hyper progressive politicians will 1. Know generally what they 
hope to accomplish in office, but 2. Will not have accrued the necessary experience and 
connections to actuate stated goals. 
 To profit from the lessons of this paper and thus from the past experience of the 
Kennedy and Obama transitions and early administrations, new hyper progressive 





Secondly, they must be sure to both 1. Appoint advisers from a variety of different 
schools of thought e.g., not Clintonian economists only, and 2. They must avoid bringing 
predominately inexperienced hands into the advisory ranks (the hyper progressive 
president themselves is already lacking in government experience).  By adhering to these 
transition guidelines, the next hyper progressive candidate-turned-president may hope to 
have installed satisfactory safeguards against the potential pitfalls of the hyper 
progressive candidate.  By controlling for their inexperience, the hyper progressive 
president may effectively embark on the enterprises they so winningly proposed to the 
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The paper will be organized as such: the first two chapters will explore the 
following first three points via the quantitative and qualitative lenses.  The paper will 
describe the foundations of progressive ambition theory as termed by Arthur 
Schlesinger in his seminal work Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United 
States, then identify the theory's failure to explain 'how' politicians run for higher 
office.  Second, this paper will explicate how the concept of disruptive innovation can 
be applied to this paper's expansion of Schlesinger's ambition theory.  The paper will 
explain how certain politicians do manage to master and triumph over their respective 
political contests.  Third, this paper will explore selected data tests to demonstrate via 
quantitative data and examples from qualitative research how candidates Kennedy and 
Obama actuated their hyper progressive ambitious abilities and stratagems. 
 In Chapter III, this paper will examine each president's capabilities as Chief 
Executive via the lens of a presidential transition to early administration crisis that 
tested the capabilities of each young Chief Executive and their transition team and 
advisers.  Through examining these two young presidents using the red flags schema 
from Finkelstein, Whitehead, and Campbell's Think Again: Why Good Leaders Make 
Bad Decisions and How to Keep It From Happening to You, it will be determined 
whether Kennedy and Obama experienced similar decision making and risk 
management failures in their respective crisis. 
In the Conclusion, practical ramifications of the existence of the successful 
hyper progressive candidate for president will be considered.  The paper will explore 





should take to guard against typical hyper progressive red flags (particularly 
misleading inexperience) that showed to be common stumbling blocks to Presidents 
Kennedy and Obama.  Once the red flags are identified, the corresponding safeguards 
provided in Think Again will be explored.  As well, the author will introduce 
counteractive procedures unearthed through this paper's research that best resist the 
encroaching and negative effects of the red flags common among hyper progressive 
candidates. 
Hyper Progressive Theory’s Origin: 
Joseph Schlesinger in his seminal work Ambition and Politics: Political 
Careers in the United States1defined the particular types of ambition that determined 
which politicians ran for what level of political office. In exploring which politicians 
would exhibit progressive ambition in seeking higher office, Schlesinger split hairs to 
make the point that his analysis centered upon identifying which politicians would seek 
higher office, and not how they would go about doing so. In building out Schlesinger’s 
typology to include the innovative concept of hyper progressive ambition, this paper 
seeks to answer Schlesinger’s unasked question of just how progressively ambitious 
politicians would achieve their goals.  
Schlesinger was focused principally on the political context of a politician, not 
necessarily any personal drive or skill that that individual happened to possess. His 
was a meta-theory, specifically designed to highlight the institutional determinants 
while obscuring the personal attributes.  Schlesinger by his own admission did not 
address the 'how': how politicians manage to achieve their progressive ambition via 




                                                          
 
 
higher office and Schlesinger intentionally focused on institutions and offices held at 
the detriment of teasing out any real nuance as to how individual political actors might 
demonstrate unique and impressive political gifts. 
The paper will use the example of two senators, John F. Kennedy and Barack H. 
Obama, who overcame their minority statuses as a Roman Catholic and black man, 
respectively, to capture the highest elected office.  It will be argued that it took a 
monumental effort by both politicians to overcome these historic barriers to 
achievement in the USA.  The paper will 
addressthefundamentallackofthe'how'inSchlesinger'sambitiontheorybypositingthatKenn
edyandObamabothwerehyperprogressivepoliticianswho achieved success early by the 
standard timeline by using the tools at their disposal to their utmost application. 
It is evident that all presidents are progressively ambition insomuch as they 
ascended to the highest political office in the country.  However, as evident in the 
scatter plot displaying the age at which the presidents since Truman first ascended to 
the presidency (Appendix), some presidents ascend at a significantly younger age than 
others. This paper posits that Schlesinger's failure to factor in the unique talents of the 
individual politician resulted in the omission of a powerful point: not all politicians are 
cut from the same cloth.  Rather, some politicians display a distinctive type of ambition 
not explored in Schlesinger's original typology, hyper progressive ambition. 
The hallmarks of a politician that displays hyper progressive ambition in the 
modern (post-World War II) political era are: 1 they achieve the zenith of progressive 
ambition on a time table far ahead of than most.  2.  They (their campaign) show 





point 1, they take advantage of disruptive innovations in elections to maximize their 
toolkit's efficaciousness. Hyper progressive politicians upgrade existing campaign 
methodology/best practices to take advantage of the emerging disruptive 
innovation2comprised of new methods/technologies in a way that maximizes efficacy 
of the organization and controls cost. 
It should be noted that other candidates may display traits similar to HPP 
(hyper progressive politicians).  For instance, a Republican representative that has 
served 6 terms might take advantage of a disruptive innovation (online fundraising) in 
defeating an incumbent Democratic Senator, thus resulting in their graduation to a 
U.S. Senate seat from the House of Representatives.  However, as this hypothetical 
candidate was not a youthful politician (Senators Kennedy and Obama had not served 
in the U.S. Senate for even two completed terms at their election to the presidency) 
then they would not classify as an HPP per the definition provided in the previous 
paragraph.   
Furthermore, while this thesis examines principally the experience of 
Democratic senators John F. Kennedy and Barack H. Obama, certainly Republican 
governors could also possess newness to politics and the sagacious appropriation of a 
disruptive innovation to achieve an early advancement to higher office.  The first 
Republican president, Abraham Lincoln, was a former one-term representative and 
adroitly out-maneuvered his rivals at the 1860 Republican nominating convention; 
however, he is of a political era prior to the Post-World War II one, and thus is not 
within the scope of this paper’s consideration.   
2Christensen, Clayton M., Michael B. Horn, and Curtis W. Johnson. 2008. Disrupting Class: How 
Disruptive Innovation Will Change the Way the World Learns. Vol. 98 McGraw-Hill New York. 
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In contrast to Lincoln, Democratic governors-turned-presidents Carter and 
Clinton are promising candidates for hyper progressive stature.  Research would be 
necessary to explore how they might have taken advantage of a disruptive innovation 
in campaigning for the presidency to qualify as true hyper progressive politicians. 
Disruptive Innovation: 
In their book Disrupting Class, authors Christensen, Horn, and Johnson 
explored the applications of the business concept of disruptive innovation to the field 
of education. The theory of disruptive innovation has relevant applicability in 
explaining how Kennedy and Obama maximized their opportunities to capture the 
White House.  Both men adroitly identified strategic openings in vaulting ahead of 
their competition. 
In business theory, a disruptive innovation is one that opens up the market of a 
product to nonconsumers who previously did not have access to the more high-end 
version of the product. In the case of Kennedy and the medium of television, 
consumers of news were those who had the time and owned subscriptions to 
newspapers.  Television disrupted the market, opening up political discourse via a new 
medium to former non consumers.  As Christensen explains, "Disruptive 
innovation...is a new plane of competition-where the very definition of what 
constitutes quality, and therefore what improvement means, is different from what 
quality and improvement meant...."3 
Thus, this paper proposes that candidates Kennedy and Obama took advantage 




                                                          
 
 
political order, consequently achieving the presidency on a time table far ahead of the 
average presidential norm.  Senator Kennedy himself presciently wrote of the 
disruptive power of the TV medium in his article for TV Guide magazine in 1959, 'A 
Force That Has Changed the Political Scene'. In this germane article, Kennedy 
examined the younger candidates that were exceeding "with particular reliance on TV 
appeal"4.  He declared, “Most of these men are comparatively young.  Their youth may 
still be a handicap in the eyes of the older politicians-but it is definitely an asset in 
creating a television image people like and (most difficult of all) remember.”  Kennedy 
was here indirectly making a compelling argument for his presidential candidacy: the 
vehicle enabled these younger politicians to reach a wider audience, thus leapfrogging 
the old dependency upon patience and seniority to obtain political power. 
I believe both Presidents JFK and BHO were hyper progressively ambitious 
politicians, actualizing sophisticated and original campaigning techniques (how they 
won) and possessing certain advantageous characteristics (why then ran), identifying 
them as such.  I will first explore and explain why they displayed hyper progressive 
ambition - e.g. their penultimate office of senator prior to running for the presidency -as 
well as how they won - e.g. erudite campaign strategy and their minority status.  
Additionally, in modifying Schlesinger's distinction between the “how” and “whom” of 
achieving higher office, I will demonstrate that the "how" and “whom” of hyper 
progressive ambition are not mutually exclusive domains, but actually form a circuitous 
relationship in that both factors co-currently act upon each other. 
All these factors (age, financing, priming, voting patterns)when combined 
4 Kennedy, John F. 1959. "A Force that has Changed the Political Scene." TV Guide Magazine. 
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together reveal two politicians that possessed a level of craft superior to the average 
progressively ambitious politician.  These men achieved the presidency much earlier 
than their post-World War II counterparts; they blew away the competition in the 
largesse of funds they brought to bear in the contest; they successfully primed their 
voters via polling and social media; and we know Senator Kennedy re-calibrated his 
Senate voting pattern to prepare for a White House run. 
 The convergence of all these traits within the examples of Presidents Kennedy 
and Obama exemplify how in the penumbra of these cases provided these two men out 
shone their peers in a variety of different competitive markers.  They were far and 
away superior campaigners when pit against their contemporaries and were rewarded 
with the White House.  A more comprehensive and general exploration might yield the 
inclusion of a generalized 'how' to Schlesinger's ambition theory: for the scope of my 
thesis, it is evident that Kennedy and Obama were in a class by themselves concerning 
how they actuated their progressive ambition. 
In chapters I-II the existence and characteristics of the American hyper 
progressive politician were both established and studied through the lens of the 
American presidents John F. Kennedy and Barack H. Obama.  In chapter III, the 
question posited is: how do such politicians execute their presidential transitions?  What 
type and quality of decision making and risk management apparatus results?  And 
finally, in the each president’s respective first crisis, does the system produce a desirable 
outcome?  This question's significance extends beyond the current Obama 
administration to potential administrations of a future hyper progressive politician that 





Why is all of this significant? 
In 2016, the United States will elect a new president; quite a few of the 
candidates currently mentioned also happen to be freshman senators as were Kennedy 
and Obama e.g. Rand Paul, Ted Cruz, and Elizabeth Warren.  Hypothetically the 
American presidential contest may see an increase in the quantity of hyper progressive 
candidates entering into the contest and enjoying ultimate success.  This trend may 
very well see itself fortified in the wake of President Obama’s successful run in 2008.  
If such a freshman senator were to emerge victorious in the presidential 
contest, having insights into how similar freshman senators such as JFK and BHO 
transitioned to the White House could prove quite useful providing pointers for how 
such victorious candidates should handle their own transition to the presidency.  
Prescriptive advice for hyper presidential candidates turned President-elect will be 
























Introduction:    
In today’s modern rough and tumble politics, where the blogosphere and press are 
stampeding to locate the next big campaign announcement for 2016, I believe the 
prescient question is both the who and the how.  The stunning success of Senator Obama 
in the presidential contest of 2008 echoed the similar shooting star effort of Senator 
Kennedy in 1960.  In the addition of hyper progressive ambition theory to Schlesinger’s 
typology, this paper seeks to expand the scope of his theory to encompass both the who 
and the how in describing the type of politician who displays the requisite characteristics, 
like Kennedy and Obama, to excel over their peers and capture the highest office in the 
land.   
This paper will be mapped out as such: 1. It will describe the foundations of 
progressive ambition theory as termed by Arthur Schlesinger in his seminal work 
Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States, then identify the theory's 
lack of explanation as to the 'how' of politicians running for higher office.  2. It will 
explicate how the concept of disruptive innovation can be applied to my adaptation of 
Schlesinger's ambition theory to explain how certain politicians do manage to affect to a 
high degree their political contests.  3., It will explore certain data tests to demonstrate 
using quantitative data how candidates Kennedy and Obama actuated their hyper 
progressive ambitious abilities and stratagems. 
 The data tests will 1. Demonstrate the order of magnitude by which Kennedy and 





Elucidate the degree by which the two candidates took full advantage the disruptive 
innovation of television and social and new media, respectively, to craft honed campaign 
stratagems to achieve victory, 3. Reveal how the candidates crafted their Senate voting 
records to optimize their electoral chances, and 4. Reveal how the presidents' age at the 
time of their ascendancy to the presidency reveals how very 'ahead of the curve' these two 
men were in claiming the top prize of our country's elective offices. 
Theory:  
 Joseph Schlesinger in his seminal work Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in 
the United States5 defined the particular types of ambition that determined which 
politicians ran for what level of political office.  In exploring which politicians would 
exhibit progressive ambition in seeking higher office, Schlesinger split hairs to make the 
point that his analysis centered upon identifying which politicians would seek higher 
office, and not how they would go about doing so.  In building out Schlesinger’s 
typology to include the innovative concept of hyper progressive ambition, I seek to 
answer Schlesinger’s unasked question of just how progressively ambitious politicians 
would achieve their goals.  As Schlesinger intoned, “In ambition theory the emphasis in 
analyzing such data is not on how one advances in politics but on who will want to 
advance.”6  
 Schlesinger believed that while it was political ambition that resulted in 
politicians running for higher office, a theory explaining who ran for higher office 
"...must rely upon findings such as those presented here about political opportunities."7In 





                                                          
 
 
other words, Schlesinger was focused most of all on the political context of a politician, 
not necessarily any personal drive or skill that that individual happened to possess.  His 
was a meta-theory, specifically designed to highlight the institutional determinants while 
obscuring the personal attributes. 
Schlesinger committed two significant omissions in his work.  1. He by his own 
admission did not address the 'how': how politicians manage to achieve their progressive 
ambition via higher office and 2 He intentionally focused on institutions and offices held 
at the detriment of teasing out any real nuance as to how individual political actors might 
demonstrate unique and impressive political gifts. 
For the paper’s two examples, John F. Kennedy and Barack H. Obama, these two 
senators overcame their minority statuses as a Roman Catholic and black man, 
respectively, to capture the highest elected office.  While perhaps historically 
disadvantageous, Schlesinger notes that such demographic limitations on one's ambition 
may be ephemeral within the scope of societal time: "Of course the success of John F. 
Kennedy in 1960 demonstrates that restrictions based on religion, race, and sex may be 
only temporary."8 
However, this paper argues that it took a monumental effort by both politicians to 
overcome these historic barriers to achievement in the USA.  Schlesinger is mum as to 
how these men might have overcome these historic tendencies, offering only that such 
barriers 'may be only temporary'.  It is posited that the fundamental lack of the 'how' in 
Schlesinger's ambition theory by positing that Kennedy and Obama both were hyper 




                                                          
 
 
tools at their disposal to their utmost application.  
 Obviously all presidents are progressively ambition insomuch as they ascended to 
the highest political office in the country.  However, as evident in the selected scatter plot 
displaying the age at which presidents ascended (Appendix), some presidents ascend at a 
younger age than others.  Schlesinger's theory offers no explanation as to how certain 
men achieved the presidency at an earlier time that the average.  Schlesinger's failure to 
factor in the unique talents of the individual politician resulted in the omission of a 
powerful point: not all politicians are cut from the same cloth.  Rather, some politicians 
display what I will term, borrowing and building upon Schlesinger's typology, hyper 
progressive ambition.  
 The hallmarks of a politician that displays hyper progressive ambition are: 
1 They achieve the zenith of progressive ambition on a time table earlier than most. 
 A. They show unusual prudence in their allocation of their campaign resources.  
 B. In conjunction with A, they take advantage of disruptive innovations in 
elections to maximize their toolkit's efficaciousness1. They upgrade existing campaign 
methodology/best practices to take advantage of the emergence disruptive innovation9 
comprised of new methods/technologies in a way that maximizes efficacy of the 
organization and controls cost. 
 As you can see, from my own table and from Schlesinger's Figure IX-1 'Age and 
Achievement of Major Office in the United States'10, Kennedy and Obama, despite the 
handicap of being a minority, captured seats in the Senate and ultimately the presidency 
9 Concept of Disruptive Innovation gleaned from: Christensen, Clayton M., Michael B. Horn, and Curtis 
W. Johnson. 2008. Disrupting Class: How Disruptive Innovation Will Change the Way the World Learns. 




                                                          
 
 
ahead of the mean (indeed, according to Schlesinger’s graphic politicians tend to first 
achieve the a Senate seat even later than first-time presidents do).  This might be yet 
another reason why historically a solid path to the presidency did not pass through the 
Senate, as by the time one on average reached the Senate they were already past the 
‘sweet spot’ window identified by Schlesinger.   
Disruptive Innovation: 
  In their book Disrupting Class, authors Christensen, Horn, and Johnson explored 
the applications of the business concept of disruptive innovation to the field of education.  
It was found that the theory of disruptive innovation possessed incredible crossover 
applicability to explaining how Kennedy and Obama maximized their opportunities to 
capture the White House.  Both men adroitly identified strategic openings in how they 
could vault ahead of their competition. 
 In business theory, a disruptive innovation is one that opens up the market of a 
product to nonconsumers who earlier did not have access to the more high-end version of 
the product.  In the case of Kennedy and television, consumers of news were those who 
had the time and owned subscriptions to newspapers.  Television disrupted the market, 
opening up political discourse via a new medium to former nonconsumers.  As 
Christensen explains, "Disruptive innovation...is a new plane of competition-where the 
very definition of what constitutes quality, and therefore what improvement means, is 
different from what quality and improvement meant...."11 
 Thus, this paper proposes that candidates Kennedy and Obama took advantage of 




                                                          
 
 
political order, consequently achieving the presidency on a time table for ahead of the 
average presidential norm.  Senator Kennedy himself presciently wrote of the disruptive 
power of the TV medium in his article for TV Guide magazine in 1959, 'A Force That 
Has Changed the Political Scene'.  In this germane article, Kennedy examined the 
younger candidates that were exceeding "…with particular reliance on TV appeal"12.   He 
declared, "Most of these men are comparatively young. Their youth may still be a 
handicap in the eyes of the older politicians-but it is definitely an asset in creating a 
television image people like and (most difficult of all) remember."  Kennedy was here 
indirectly making a compelling argument for his presidential candidacy: the vehicle of 
TV enabled these younger politicians to reach a wider audience, thus leapfrogging the old 
dependency upon patience and seniority to obtain political power.   
 Thus, the disruptive power of television granted Kennedy entree into the arena of 
the top contenders for the presidency in 1960.  Other politicians had already profited 
from its emergence, but Senator Kennedy had the imagination to appropriate the new 
technology to its fullest capacity.  No better example exists then his thrashing of Vice 
President Nixon in their first presidential debate in 1960.  However, it costs money to pay 
for all that television coverage.   
I. Money, Honey 
 Identifying exactly how much money candidate Kennedy raised for his 1960 
primary and general campaigns for the presidency is an exceedingly tricky business.  As 
illuminated by an exceedingly helpful report put out by the Citizens' Research 
Foundation in 1962, in 1960 there was "...no federal requirement that pre-nomination 
12Kennedy, John F. 1959. "A Force that has Changed the Political Scene." TV Guide Magazine. 
14 
 
                                                          
 
 
expenses be disclosed...”13  However the authors made a good-faith effort to tabulate 
the total primary election expenditures for each of the major candidates; it is from this 
data that I intend to make a comparison of the total fundraising efforts of contenders 
Kennedy and Obama vis a vis their peers of 1960 and 2008. 
 The compilers of Financing the 1960 Election were able to determine that 
candidate Kennedy and his family contributed $150,000 towards his primary campaign 
(based upon the records of the Democratic National Committee).14  The authors noted, 
"The Kennedy family assiduously avoided any financial arrangements that would 
embarrass the Senator, and this limited excessive spending."15  However, we can imagine 
that the famed Kennedy fortune of Kennedy's father, Joe Kennedy, would have been 
brought to bear in this seminal contest, even if clandestinely.  We also know that in 1960 
there was no federal limit on the amount candidate Kennedy could himself spend on his 
campaign, and he did not have to report whatever he did spend.16 
 Kennedy, weighing in at total predicted expenditures of $912,500, possessed 
49.1% of the total $1.86 million spent among the top five Democratic primary 
contenders.   By whatever means Kennedy used to acquire this surfeit of funding, he 
clearly put it to good use, winning the pivotal Wisconsin and West Virginia primaries to 
eviscerate the Catholic question and pave his way to winning the Democratic Convention 
on the 1st ballot. 
 The authors of  Financing the 1960 Election theorize that the large pocketbook 
13Alexander, Herbert E. 1962. Financing the 1960 Election. Citizens' Research Foundation. Study no.5. 






                                                          
 
 
may have liberated Kennedy's campaign strategy: "A wealthy candidate...may have a 
psychological advantage in attitudes toward incurring debts.  The Kennedy political 
approach has been marked by notable risk-taking, and the lack of money would hardly be 
a deterrent if spending seemed necessary to achieve victory."17  In other words, since 
Kennedy knew he was playing with half of the total Democratic primary money in play, 
he and his campaign team likely felt that they could afford to take calculated risks in the 
primary e.g. compete in the West Virginia primary to combat the concern that Kennedy 
could not win over Protestant voters for the general election.   
  It is relevant whether candidate Obama had a similar proportion of his party's total 
primary race money in his coffers.  The numbers for the 2008 primaries will appear 
abnormally large compared to 1960 in part due to inflation; therefore, it is spurious to 
simply compare the quantity of dollars spent between 1960 and 2008 and much wiser to 
compare the total proportion of Obama to his Democratic contenders in 2008. 
 If we take Obama’s primary expenditure amount of: $414 million and divide that 
by the sum of all Democratic contenders: 414/731=56.63%.  That is in the ballpark of the 
percentage advantage that candidate Kennedy enjoyed over his opponents in the 1960 
Democratic primary (49.1%).  Thus, both hyper progressively ambitious politicians 
Kennedy and Obama out-funded their Democratic rivals in their respective primaries by a 
health margin.   
   As well, if we directly compare Kennedy to Nixon’s primary fundraising totals: 
$912500/500000=1.825.  Kennedy raised 1.825 times as much funds as Nixon to play 




                                                          
 
 
$414/221=1.873.  Obama raised 1.873 times as much funds as McCain did in the 2008 
primary.  Thus, Kennedy and Obama had an uncannily similar proportional advantage 
over their opponents in their respective primary fundraising efforts.  It should be noted 
that in 1960 Vice President Nixon was the heir apparent to President Eisenhower and 
faced no serious primary opposition for the Republican nomination, whereas in 2008 
Senator McCain engaged in a significant tussle with other Republicans to secure the 
nomination. 
 It is unfortunately not possible to compare the fundraising efforts of Kennedy and 
Obama concerning their general campaigns as the Citizens’ Research Foundation could 
not offer satisfactory numbers on how much the Kennedy and Nixon general campaigns 
raised (as earlier noted, the primary campaign totals themselves were rough estimates).  
1960 was in the pre-FEC (Federal Election Commission) era, as explained to me by an 
FEC official, “Please note that the FEC "opened its doors" in 1975 and has campaign 
finance data only from 1972 - present.  Presidential Funding started with the 1976 
election”.18  Thus, it is not possible to include 1960 general election data for analysis; 
therefore, this paper will not include 2008 general election data as a comparison point. 
II. What They Did With All That Coin 
Candidate Kennedy Priming 
 Both Barack Obama and John Kennedy sedulously followed the polling numbers 
to calibrate their campaign messaging.  They naturally sought to optimize the percentage 
of voters that received their targeted messaging so that they could capture the largest 
18Julie Kinzer, Public Affairs Specialist Public Records Office Federal Election Commission. 2014. 1960 
JFK Fundraising Data Request. Vol. Email Correspondence Between Myself and the FEC. 
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number of votes.  Of course, all politicians and their campaigns seek to do the exact same 
thing.  However, this section will demonstrate that Kennedy and Obama not only did this 
but executed with a precision and purpose to achieve dynamic results. 
 As only under six years have elapsed since the 2008 election, quantitative analysis 
for how campaign and speech messaging was influenced by Obama's campaign efforts is 
sadly lacking.  For Obama, we must rely mainly on the qualitative analysis of his actions.  
However, for President Kennedy, the study Issues, Candidate Image, and Priming: The 
Use of Private Polls in Kennedy’s 1960 Presidential Campaign by Lawrence R. Jacobs 
and Robert Y. Shapiro, offers scholars an excellent resource for assessing how candidate 
Kennedy calibrated his campaign messaging to sync with the findings of his private 
pollster, Louis Harris.19 
 Looking at Table 1 on page 532 of Jacobs and Shapiro, we can begin to see a 
trend emerge: Senator Kennedy adjusted the issues on which he took policy stances in a 
given week.  We see that over time the issues cited in Harris’ polls are more likely to be 
brought up as policy concerns by the candidate when compared to issues not polled for.  
Looking at the last line of Table 1, we see that on average across all weeks of the 1960 
general campaign Kennedy took policy stances on 56% of those issues cited in polls as 
compared to 27% of issues which were not so-cited.  This clearly shows a relationship 
between the public and the candidate: the deeper question is from which direction the 
influence is being exerted. 
 As Jacobs and Shapiro elucidated, “Our quantitative analysis confirms that 
19Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1994. "Issues, Candidate Image, and Priming: The use of 




                                                          
 
 
Kennedy’s positions responded to public opinion: the issues that were raised in Louis 
Harris’s polls were persistently mentioned by Kennedy in his subsequent public 
statements.  What is significant is not just that Kennedy cited issues identified by the 
public but that the frequency and strength of his stance was congruent or consistent with 
the public’s preferred direction for policy.”20Thus, candidate Kennedy was shown to be 
clearly responsive to the priming instigated by those polled!  In return, Kennedy 
intentionally primed the electorate by parroting the policy concerns of those polled.  It 
appears that an echo chamber effect took hold; Harris’ polls informed Kennedy as to 
what issues were significant to the public; Kennedy then, 56 to 27 percent, emphasized 
those policy concerns in his public statements.  It becomes difficult if not impossible to 
untangle where the loop started or began.  More research would be necessary to access 
the public’s top issues prior to Harris’ polling to ascertain the public’s true concerns pre-
echo chamber effect.   
 Whether Kennedy or the electorate were the chicken or the egg, what is clear is 
that candidate Kennedy intentionally took advantage of the disruptive innovation of 
modern polling to ascertain the favored policy issues of the electorate.  Thus, Kennedy 
displayed a hyper progressive ambitious trait.  Next, we will explore Kennedy’s 
legislative record leading up to his presidential campaign and how his legislative record 
in the Senate could prove an exemplar of a hyper progressively ambitious politician 
working his craft. 
Candidate Obama and the New (Read: Social) Media 




                                                          
 
 
standard procedure by CNN, the Pew Research Center, and National Election Exit Polls, 
to name a few sources.21  However, while Kennedy had taken advantage of the disruptive 
innovation potentialities of polling, Obama, to a degree far dwarfing his rivals, took 
advantage of the disruptive power of social media (in particular, with Facebook and 
YouTube). 
 In his chapter 'No Laughing Matter: The Role of New Media in the 2008 
Election', Girish J. Gulati unpacked in quantitative terms just how great the Obama 
campaign dominated social media in promulgating its campaign message of hope and 
change.  Examining Table 1: 'YouTube Activity in the 2008 Presidential Campaign, 
January 3, 2008', we can appreciate in numerological terms the sheer force of the Obama 
campaign's domination of this new media.22  The other candidates were simply buried. 
 While Obama 'only' had 35.6% of the total subscriber population relative to the 
Democratic candidate field, his total video views comprised 70.3% of total views through 
January 3, 2008.23  From this information,  it is hypothesized that Obama's candidacy had 
extreme crossover appeal; people were viewing Obama's YouTube channel who were not 
subscribers but simply interested in learning more about his candidacy.  In this way, it 
seems apparent that Obama's campaign executed a multi-pronged media saturation 
strategy to get the Senator's name recognition to sky rocket.  Or, in other words, his 
campaign was priming the voters via his own YouTube channel with tailor-made 
messaging, much like candidate Kennedy had done with his polling practices. 





                                                          
 
 
 In analyzing Table 124, what first popped out to the author was Ron Paul’s 
impressive YouTube subscriber showing.  This paper ascribes Paul’s prodigious 
following to the enthusiasm that Paul’s libertarian supporters brought to his campaign as 
he infused a third party-sensibility that galvanized Libertarians from outside the Republic 
party.  However, if one were to simply glance at these numbers you could be forgiven for 
wondering why Paul himself did not sweep the Republican nomination going by 
subscribers alone.  This is where it is important to revisit the funding amounts raised in 
2008 to see that McCain out-fundraised Paul 221 to 35 million.  Having a large online 
following (and perhaps predominately polarized Libertarians) did not overcome McCain's 
formidable war chest. 
Gulati provided pivotal further quantitative data demonstrating the Obama 
campaign's mastery of the new media with Table 2: 'Facebook Support in the 2008 
Presidential Campaign January 4, 2008-November 4, 2008'.25  Here, we can witness how 
swiftly Obama's Facebook supporter count ballooned over the course of the general 
campaign against Senator John McCain.  At the time of the election, Obama had 
2,397,253 supporters vs. McCain's 622,860; that is 3.85 times the number of supporters 
as the Republican candidate for president.   
 Of course, we also know that Obama's supporters for president were 
overwhelmingly younger than McCain's supporters.  According to the National Exit Poll, 
66% of those polled aged 18-29 voted for Barack Obama, compared to 32% for 






                                                          
 
 
Facebook supporters may be more a sign of the age demographic that used Facebook in 
2008 than of the overall effectiveness of Obama's campaign in wooing voters generally. 
 Another gem mined by the National Election Poll is whether the Obama and 
McCain campaigns contacted the voter.  26% of all polled said they had been contacted 
by the Obama campaign compared to 18% for McCain.  This is not an insignificant 
difference of 8 percentage points considering that when voters confirmed they had been 
contacted by Obama's campaign, 64% of them voted for Obama, as compared to 60% for 
McCain.27  Depending on which kind of voter (committed to one candidate or the other, 
or still undecided) was contacted would be helpful information to determine the 
significance of the sway being contacted by a campaign would hold. 
 It remains a chicken and egg question as to whether funding or savvy strategy 
pushed these Kennedy and Obama to victory.  However, what is crystal clear is that 
Kennedy (polling) and Obama (YouTube, Facebook) took full advantage of these 
disruptive innovations to reach, analyze, and understand more voters than their 
opponents.  All the contenders in 1960 and 2008 were progressively ambitious; only 
Kennedy and Obama were able to combine such a significant amount of funding with 
brilliant strategic appropriation of new technologies to achieve victory over their peers.   
III. Voting Record 
Kennedy Voting 
 Charles H. Gray, from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand in 1965 
executed a highly useful quantitative study exploring the voting record of then-Senator 




                                                          
 
 
Johnson (Senator Goldwater, Republican candidate for president in 1964, is also included 
in his study).28Analyzing the roll call votes of these three senators, Gray attempted to 
determine whether the candidates for president altered their voting pattern between the 
85th and 86th Congresses.   
 The time window of these two Congresses overlapped with the 1960 presidential 
election.  The 85th Congress occurred from January 1957-January 1959; the 86th, January 
1959-January 1961.  Thus, taking a snapshot of the roll call vote of senators Kennedy and 
Johnson between these two Congresses offers a useful opportunity to analyze whether or 
not the two candidates for president modulated their voting pattern to best prepare 
themselves for a presidential run.   
 Gray analyzed five distinct policy areas for his study; this paper will focus on two 
of his five for the purposes of my quantitative analysis: civil rights (Figure 3) and foreign 
military aid (Figure 4).  Both these policy areas were major ‘hot button’ issues of the time 
and both were areas that where the American public expected the President to take a 
significant policy stance.  Gray expands upon the significance of civil rights thus, 
“Positions of the parties and of the three senators changed more radically on this scale 
than on any other between the two Congresses.  In the campaign year of 1960 the 
Northern Democrats took over as the champion of civil rights while most Republicans 
moved into the position just above the Southern Democrats.”29 
 For candidate Kennedy, his party’s shifting towards a more liberal position on 
civil rights is most significant.  It means that, if Kennedy hoped to capture the 
28Gray, Charles H. 1965. "A Scale Analysis of the Voting Records of Senators Kennedy, Johnson and 




                                                          
 
 
Democratic nomination, it behooved the candidate to be as close to the party norm as was 
prudent and tenable.  Thus, we should predict, as Gray imported, that Kennedy, a 
Northern Democrat, would correspondingly shift his voting record on civil rights 
accordingly, and so he did.30 
 Gray explained, “The most dramatic shift was made by Kennedy, who with 
twelve other senators voted pro-civil rights on every roll call…Johnson, on the other 
hand, moved up the scale to the lukewarm position from which Kennedy and Goldwater 
had departed in opposite directions.”31Thus, in this case, both Kennedy and Johnson 
displayed classical progressive ambition: Kennedy wisely adjusted his policy stance on 
civil rights to match with twelve of his colleagues so that he could maintain his outward 
perception as a Northern Democrat.  Johnson moved as far to the middle as he could to 
stay competitive for the national campaign while not ostracizing himself from his 
Southern Democratic allies.   
 This sense of Kennedy acting in a progressively ambitious manner, but not 
achieving any sort of genius in his voting record, is affirmed when we study his foreign 
military aid roll calls between the Congresses.  In this example, he and Johnson's 
movement matched exactly.  Both Senators Kennedy and Johnson adjusted their roll call 
votes to become more pro-aid as they approached their presidential runs.32  Perhaps it 
may have appeared more ‘presidential’ to be pro-foreign aid, as presidents historically 
have exercised more foreign than domestic power in the Oval Office.   






                                                          
 
 
above indicate pretty clearly that the lure of the presidency exerts a magnetism, as the 
time for nominations approaches, capable of altering the public stands that senators, qua 
senators, have previously taken on issues with an ideological content.”33Here, Gray hints 
at the presence of a priming power possessed by the office of the presidency itself that 
exerts an influence upon the senators who seek the presidency.  The ‘magnetism’ 
compels ambitious senators to adjust their policy stances to best-position themselves for a 
successful presidential run.  Joseph Schlesinger would also in the same year as Gray’s 
work was published (1965) expand upon this magnetism to explain how who which 
politicians will want to advance, though not necessarily how they will advance.   
Obama Voting 
 Unfortunately, we were unable to locate a similar analysis performed on Senator 
Obama's voting record.  In spite of this lack of similar research, it was decided to review 
Senator Obama's voting record from 2005 (his first year in the Senate) through 2008 (his 
last full year serving in that chamber), e.g. the 109th and 110th Congresses.  This voting 
window mirrors the duration of time of Gray's examination of Kennedy's voting record in 
the 85th and 86th Congresses.  The search was narrowed to key legislation via Project 
Vote Smart's Key Votes listing, which identified key senatorial votes based upon criteria 
e.g. how much media attention a vote had garnered and how contentious the vote was. 
 Senator Obama announced his presidential campaign on February 10th, 2007, 
approximately two years into his first senatorial term.  Using this date as a benchmark, 
we will first examine relevant key votes prior to and then after this date.  In November 




                                                          
 
 
Drug Amendment, foreshadowing his increased interest in health care reform.  As well, 
in May 2006 the Senator voted 'yea' for S. 2611, the Immigration Reform Bill.34  This 
vote certainly would have aided him with courting the Latino vote prior to his 2008 
presidential campaign launch.  It is quite possible that Senator Obama sought to both 1. 
Emphasize his policy expertise in health care reform, a popular public issue at the time 
and 2. Court Latino voters in preparation for his 2008 presidential run. 
 In March 2007, Senator Obama was fresh off his announcement of his candidacy 
for President; there may not have been a better time for him to have voted 'yea' to the 
United States Policy in Iraq Resolution of 2007.  Irrespective of politics, beefing up his 
foreign policy credentials and therefore appearing more 'presidential' are tried and true 
presidential efforts.  In October of 2007, the future president voted for the DREAM Act, 
another pro-Latino vote.  Perhaps most notably, Obama in December 2007 was a co-
sponsor for the Iraq Withdrawal Amendment (S. Amdt 3875).  As he was already hitting 
Clinton hard at the time on her support for the Iraq War, co-sponsoring this bill would 
have served to further enhance his foreign policy credentials while directly assaulting 
Clinton on an unpopular war at home.   
 In July 2008, Obama voted 'yea' for the HR 6331 Medicare Bill.  At this point he 
knew he had clinched the Democratic nomination and was likely looking to strengthen 
his campaign narrative of being pro-affordable health care coverage for all Americans.  
Thus, from this quick purview of Senator Obama's voting record, we can see a candidate 
that intentionally and selectively co-sponsored and voted for issues that would help voters 
perceive the candidate as pro-Latino, pro-health care reform, and anti-Iraq War even 




                                                          
 
 
before the first debate commenced. Senator Obama was not yet a Senator at the time of 
the tendentious Iraq War Resolution of 2002 (a vote that he later bludgeoned Senator 
Clinton with during the Democratic primaries).  A necessary contribution to this field of 
study would entail ranking as did Gray the gradations of change in voting behavior from 
one Congress to the next for Senators Obama and Clinton.   
 Senators Made President: Rare Birds 
 One of the most compelling reasons to place Kennedy and Obama in an exalted 
status among the ambitious is simply that, as sitting senators they managed to be directly 
elected to the presidency.  As the United States Senate explains, “Three senators, Warren 
G. Harding, John F. Kennedy, and Barack Obama moved directly from the U.S. Senate to 
the White House.”35Only sixteen senators, sitting or former, have gone on to serve as 
president, or 16/44=36% of all presidents.36It is compelling that only in the 20th and early 
21st centuries have senators ever been directly elected to the White House, and then so 
sparingly. 
 Barry C. Burden, in his scholarly article United States Senators as Presidential 
Candidates (Spring 2002), sought to quantify the number of senators who ran for 
president compared with their peers, predominately governors, vice presidents, and 
sitting presidents.  Looking at Burden’s work, it becomes apparent that achieving the 
presidency through the Senate is not typically done and only recently has appeared as a 
viable option. 
 Examining Burden's Table 2, we see that between the presidential elections of 





                                                          
 
 
1960-1996, the majority of contenders were either current or former senators 
(44.6%).37Governors were the next most numerous type of candidate, at 23%.  Sitting 
senators came in at 33.8% of the total.  Clearly, in the post-war presidential contest era 
senators make up the largest bloc of candidates for the highest office. 
 Things get interesting when you look at who actually wins the presidency.  60% 
of the winning contenders from 1960-1996 had no previous senatorial experience.  30% 
of the winners were former senators, while only 10% of those winners were senators 
(knowing the data, that 10% is comprised by the presence of John Kennedy!).38  Thus, 
among the 10 presidential elections held from 1960-1996, 6 of the winners had never 
been a senator, 3 were former senators, and only one, Kennedy, was a sitting senator.  
Clearly, the statistically best path to the White House is not directly through the United 
States Senate.   
 In the next chapter this paper will engage deeply with the more qualitative-based 
sections of Burden.  Pressing questions that arise here include: it will be hypothesized 
that after seeing JFK make a successful run for the presidency from his seat in the Senate, 
other senators throughout the latter half of the 1900s decided that they too could make a 
similar run.  This thus resulted in a greater number of sitting senators who attempted to 
become president, as they were inspired by Kennedy's successful effort. What 
ultimately amounted to JFK admiration (in the qualitative chapter, we will explore how 
then-candidate Obama appropriated the imagery of JFK’s Camelot to achieve his own 
historic run to the White House) happened to coincide with a seismic change in the power 
37Burden, Barry C. 2002."United States Senators as Presidential Candidates." Political Science 




                                                          
 
 
distribution within the Senate.39  This change in the influence of less senior senators 
occurred in tandem with the disruptive innovation of television for JFK and later the 
internet and accompanying blogosphere for Obama.   
 Eve Lubalin and Robert L. Peabody, like Burden, explored the prior office-
holding experience of presidential contenders, nominees, and victors in their chapter The 
Making of Presidential Candidates from the compilation The Future of the American 
Presidency (1975).40They were like Burden interested in the seemingly modern 
phenomenon of more and more senators throwing their hats in the ring for the 
presidential contest.  Their first few tables explore the previous roles of presidential 
contenders prior to the race, but are harder to utilize because they do not isolate the data 
points between those who ran, were nominated, and actually won the presidential 
contests.  In this way, Burden’s data tables are much more useful for my search for hyper 
progressive ambition. 
 However, they compiled one data chart that is quite unique and demonstrative of 
Sinclair’s conceptualization of a technological innovation acting upon the why of senators 
entering a nominating contest.  Table 2 on p. 54 provides an illustration of the positive 
trend in the number of subcommittees in the United States Senate from 1950-1970.  From 
1950-1970, the number of subcommittees ballooned from 60 to 144.41That is a net gain 
of 84 subcommittees; thus, 84 more opportunities for freshman senators to obtain 
leadership roles within the Senate.   Thus, the authors quantifiably offered a clear 
example of why today’s senators would have a better chance than in the past at capturing 
39Sinclair, Barbara. 1989. The Transformation of the US Senate Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore: 
5-6. 




                                                          
 
 
the US presidency: they simply have a greater opportunity to exercise a leadership role 
within the Senate.  As Lubalin and Peabody elucidated, “By enhancing such opportunities 
to lead public opinion on new issues through the use of nationally broadcast hearings, 
nightly news coverage, and guest appearances, presidentially ambitious senators, 
especially those of the majority party, have exploited the potential for national leadership 
now inherent in Senate incumbency.”42 
IV. The Post-War Presidents’ Age 
 One of the simplest ways to analyze the degree to which Presidents Kennedy and 
Obama displayed hyper progressive ambition would be to compare the ages at which 
these two men ascended to the presidency to the other presidents of the Post-World War 
II era.  The distinction is made between winning a presidential contest and ascending to 
the presidency to account for the cases of Presidents Truman, Johnson, and Ford, in 
which they first became president due not to victory in an election but through the Vice 
Presidential office they held, as the sitting president left the office due to death or 
resignation.  
 Schlesinger himself illustrated the % of politicians who attain a certain office at a 
certain age in Figure IX-1 'Age and Achievement of Major Office in the United States'43.  
Concerning the time of presidential ascendance, Schlesinger analyzes, “By far the 
greatest proportion of the men elected President through 1960 are in their early 
fifties…”44  Kennedy and Obama attained the presidency at the much earlier ages of 43 






                                                          
 
 
an age well ahead of the curve circa the 1960s. 
 The data was run starting from President Truman through the present sitting 
president, President Obama (conveniently one of the politicians analyzed for signs of 
hyper progressive ambition) as Truman was the first post-World War II president to 
serve.  To use data from pre-World War II presidents would be anachronistic, as the 
nature of presidential selection-making at the time would not line up with the changes in 
how campaigns are run and won in the modern era.  It was desirable to ensure not 
comparing apples to oranges, e.g. George Washington to Barack Obama to control for 
changes in life expectancy and the political process generally.  Therefore this analysis 
will cover the time period of 1945 through 2008 (when Obama first ran for and achieved 
the presidency).   
 For the resulting graph, see the Appendix.  First, the most compelling trend to 
note is that of the negative slope of the line of best fit.  The slope of the basic algebraic 
form y=mx+b is slope m=-.416.  Here, a one unit change in x is related to a shift from 
one presidential ascendance age to another e.g. from Truman’s age at becoming president 
moving to Eisenhower’s age when he assumed the presidency.  Thus, the trend is that a 
change from one presidency to the next is associated with about a 4/10 of a year decrease 
in the age of the next president.  From this, we can surmise that the Post-World War II 
trend is that presidents are becoming incrementally younger. 
 Of course, the sample size taken in this graph (12 presidents) is not large enough 
to adequately determine statistical significance.  However, this visual does offer a 
powerful demonstration of just how 'below the curve' Kennedy and Obama were relative 





youthfulness are Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, two Democratic governors.   
 It is also fascinating to note that it appears that all the presidents below the line 
were Democrats while all save Truman above the line were Republicans.  This might 
suggest that those politicians that wish to achieve big early might be better served to be in 
the Democratic Party in the current political climate.  Certainly in the post-War era to 
today the Democratic Party has been more associated with minority interests than the 
Republican Party; that Kennedy and Obama were both minority candidates merely adds 
greater credence to this vein of thought. 
 Regardless, clearly presidents Kennedy and Obama save Clinton were the 
youngest post-War presidents to achieve the presidency.  On strictly a question of who 
grabbed the brass ring earliest in their careers, these two men stand out.  Coupled with the 
following analyses, it stands a significant point of reference for why these two men stood 
in a class of ambition ahead of even their presidential peers. 
Conclusion:  
 All these factors (age, financing, priming, voting patterns) when combined 
together reveal two politicians that possessed a level of craft superior to the average 
progressively ambitious politician.  These men achieved the presidency much earlier than 
their post-World War II counterparts; they blew away the competition in the amounts of 
funds they brought to bear in the contest; they successfully primed their voters via polling 
and social media; and we know Senator Kennedy re-calibrated his Senate voting pattern 
to prepare for a White House Run. 
 The convergence of all these traits within the examples of Presidents Kennedy 





outshone their peers in a variety of different competitive markers.  They were far and 
away superior campaigners when pit against their contemporaries and were rewarded 
with the White House.  A more comprehensive and general exploration might yield the 
inclusion of a generalized 'how' to Schlesinger's ambition theory: for the scope of this 
thesis, it is evident that Kennedy and Obama were in a class by themselves concerning 
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II. Qualitative Study of Hyper Progressive Ambition 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, we explored through quantitative analysis how both JFK 
and BHO (Barack Hussein Obama) displayed traits of a new category of politicians, the 
hyper progressively ambitious politician.  The theoretical foundations of this class of 
politician are rooted in the political theory of Joseph Schlesinger's seminal work, 
Ambition and Politics.  Schlesinger's original treatise purposefully limited itself to 
investigating which politicians display ambition.  It was realized that Schlesinger's 
concept of progressive ambition (that of a politician seeking to advance to a higher office 
than the one they currently hold) could be expanded out to both 1. Explain how 
progressively ambitious politicians achieve higher office and 2. Encompass a more 
advanced class of political animal, that of the hyper progressively ambitious politician. 
 In the 20th century through the early 21st century, only two minority-status United 
States senators managed to be directly elected to the Presidency: John F. Kennedy and 
Barack H. Obama.  These men were minority candidates who successfully navigated 
myriad electoral pitfalls to become the first Catholic and African American to attain the 
country’s highest office.45  JFK and BHO were examples of an archetypical candidate 
type, that of the young gun intellect riding into Washington to reinvigorate the Republic.  
The press helped build and reinforce this narrative.  Exactly what type of candidate were 
these two future presidents, and has the literature fully expressed the complexities of such 
a candidate? 
 It is believe both Presidents JFK and BHO were hyper progressively ambitious 
45Smith, Robert C. 2013. John F. Kennedy, Barack Obama, and the Politics of Ethnic Incorporation and 
Avoidance.SUNY Series in African American Studies. Albany: State University of New York Press: 1. 
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politicians, actualizing sophisticated and original campaigning techniques (how they 
won) and possessing certain advantageous characteristics (why then ran), identifying 
them as such.  We will first explore and explain why they displayed hyper progressive 
ambition - e.g. their penultimate office of senator prior to running for the presidency -as 
well as how they won - e.g. erudite campaign strategy and their minority status.  
Additionally, in modifying Schlesinger's distinction between the “how” and “whom” of 
achieving higher office, we will demonstrate that the "how" and “whom” of hyper 
progressive ambition are not mutually exclusive domains, but actually form a circuitous 
relationship in that both factors co-currently act upon each other. 
 It is important to note that it is not believed that JFK and BHO are necessarily the 
only hyper progressively ambitious politicians.  For instance, Governors Clinton and 
Carter (both future presidents) shared the same penchant ask JFK and BHO for achieving 
the presidency well ahead of the age curve (see Chapter I: Appendix).  However, this 
paper is principally an investigation of Kennedy and Obama as their many biographical 
similarities and similar outcomes make them perfect candidates for such a cross-
comparison, a comparison across an approximately 50 year span (1960-2008). 
 While the previous chapter utilized mainly quantitative data to make the case that 
Kennedy and Obama were hyper progressive politicians based upon the prodigiousness 
of their campaign accomplishments - e.g. amount of funds raised and media attention 
garnered - in this chapter we hope to principally demonstrate the similitude between the 
two candidates and their campaigns.   We will bolster these quantitative findings by 
affirming their shared identity as hyper progressively ambitious politicians from Chapter 





political style between these two men.  Thus, in demonstrating through the qualitative 
examples of this chapter the striking political similarities of these two candidates, when 
combined with the numerical similitudes form Chapter I, thus affirms the existence of a 
rarified breed of political candidate: that of the hyper progressively ambitious politician, 
for which JFK and Barack Obama are superb examples. 
I. What Factors Primed JFK and BHO to Possess and Demonstrate Hyper 
Progressive Ambition 
 
 A. The History of Senators Running for President 
 
 In order to comprehend why Senators Kennedy and Obama displayed the 
presidential ambition they did, it is important to first explore what it has historically 
meant for a senator to run for the presidency.  In actuality, senators have had an abysmal 
record in being directly elected to the nation's highest office.  In the quantitative chapter 
of this thesis, it was explored how senators are typically too old and have too many 
legislative liabilities to win a presidential contest.  This makes the successes of Kennedy 
and Obama all the more impressive, while also putting their ultimate political successes 
in context.  In this section, we will first explore the historical handicaps senators have 
faced in running for national office, and then segue to the following sections discussing 
how these two senators overcame such obstacles - e.g. minority status, youth, 
branding/image appeal. 
 Kirk Victor's article, “Breaking Out is Hard to Do,” emphasizes that it would 
appear the more tenured a senator is, the less likely they will be successful in running for 
the White House.  "The two senators in the 20th century who succeeded as presidential 





marginal figures, Harding and Kennedy."46  It should be noted that Victor penned this 
article in 2004, four years before then-Senator Obama's fruitful 2008 campaign.  
However, Kirk is on to something distinctive: while the public tends to think of senators 
as prime prospects for a presidential run, their historical record in achieving the 
presidency has proved abysmal. 
 Interestingly enough, the only three senators (Warren Harding, Kennedy, and 
Obama, according to the Senate’s website47) who have ever been elected directly to the 
presidency were all early on in their Senatorial careers (Harding and Obama were both 
freshmen, whereas Kennedy was merely early into his second term).  Clymer, in his 
article, “Sit Down and Legislate for a While,” of November 2006, chastised young 
senators for scheming for the presidency upon arrival in the Senate.  He believes that by 
properly attending to one's senatorial duties, one will construct a formidable resume that 
will serve one in good stead if and when a senator decides they will run for the 
presidency.48 
 However, I believe that Clymer's conclusion was incorrect: if one wishes to be a 
president, don't be a senator; and if one is a senator, run for president at the first possible 
opportunity.  For the longer one serves, the less likely it is he or she will ever become 
president. This is due to the fact that accumulating a copious voting record can easily be 
interpreted by political opponents as flip-flopping.  Kennedy and Obama knew this, and 
presumably entered presidential campaign mode the moment they arrived in the upper 
chamber.  Both men would have sought to avoid contentious, ambition-threatening votes 
46Victor, Kirk. 2004. "Breaking Out is Hard to do." National Journal 36 (14): 1020: 7. 
47"Http://www.Senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/senators_became_president.Htm.", 
accessed November/12, 2013. 
48Clymer, Adam. 2006. "Sit Down and Legislate for a while." New York Times 156 (53763): A27-A27. 
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and cast coalition-building, broad-appeal votes in the chamber.  As then-Senator and 
Majority Leader LBJ complained, "Jack Kennedy was out there kissing babies, while I 
was getting the laws passed."49  
 Marc Ambinder wrote a piece in the Atlantic Monthly spinning the tale of the 
relationship between Senators Clinton and Obama as both geared up to run for president, 
“Teacher and Apprentice.”  Most interesting here is Ambinder’s focus on a ‘process-
oriented’ campaign model that Obama ultimately honed so well: “it {the model} is 
concerned less with specific policies and positions than with broad themes related to 
politics itself...such as its larger purpose."50This builds on both Sorensen’s and Victor’s 
emphasis on the very genius of a young senator’s presidential aspirations: they lack a 
copious voting record to be bludgeoned with, and the savvy ones know to be sure not to 
offer too-specific policy proposals that can leave themselves a prime target for a focused 
assault on their candidacy.  This, coupled with a unifying message to offset their minority 
status, results in a candidate that is seemingly unassailable and irresistibly attractive to 
the American people. 
 Kenneth T. Walsh provided a counter-argument to the pro-‘process-oriented’ 
campaigning that Kennedy and Obama efficaciously implemented in their campaigns.  
Writing solely on the Obama campaign in March of 2008(when it appeared that Senator 
Clinton was making a strong counter-surge against Obama), Walsh believed that Obama 
was having new difficulties finishing Clinton off because he had not yet offered the 
American people a more descriptive policy plan.  Walsh chastised Obama thus, "The best 
49Victor, 6. 
50Ambinder, Marc. 2007. "Teacher and Apprentice." Atlantic Monthly (10727825) 300 (5): 56: 5-6. 
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use of charisma, historians say, is to harness it in the service of specific goals."51This 
paper believes that in the final analysis of what pushed Kennedy and Obama definitively 
over the finish line was their incorporation of minority status-neutralizing speeches.  If 
you inspire the American public, grab their heartstrings, all you have left to do is 
convince them that you are one of them (i.e. neutralize your minority status).  Once this is 
accomplished, you are a most formidable presidential opponent. 
 
 B. Exploring Variables Shared by JFK and BHO that Set Them Apart  
 
 At universities across the country there appears to have been of late a general 
interest in studying progressive ambition within the United States Senate and House of 
Representatives.  As both candidates Kennedy and Obama displayed progressive 
ambition in pursuing the White House, dovetailing occurs in two articles researched.  
Progressive ambition is an ambition in which an individual desires a higher office; in the 
case of a U.S. senator, there are only two higher elected offices: that of the U.S. 
Presidency and Vice Presidency.  Therefore, unpacking articles that have explored 
progressive ambition through a quantitative lens can provide a methodical approach to 
studying potential similitudes between the two candidates.   
 In an article entitled “Moving on Up: Political Ambition and the Timing of 
Decisions to Run for Higher Office,” Emily O. Wanless of the University of Georgia 
investigated which characteristics made politicians more likely to “emerge "or enter into 
a campaign.  In Chapter 4 of her paper, entitled “U.S. Senators Running for U.S. 
President,” she explored this fundamental question: "Which influential factors increase or 




                                                          
 
 
decrease the rate in which senators emerge as presidential candidates?"52This query is 
essentially seeking to identify those variables that lead to some senators seeking the 
presidency (i.e. manifesting their progressive ambition), while others choose not to 
pursue it.  For purposes of this critical review, we sought to pinpoint which variables 
Wanless isolated those variables that both Senators Kennedy and Obama possessed at the 
time of their deciding to emerge for president.  Among the factors Wanless controlled for 
in her regressions, the two candidates shared the following: 1. they both sat on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee when they declared their presidential campaigns, 2. both 
were what Wanless categorized as “nontraditional” candidates (i.e. either a woman or a 
racial/ethnic minority), and 3. both ran for president when no incumbent was present in 
the race (in 1960, President Eisenhower had already served two terms and was thus 
ineligible to run; the same was true of President George W. Bush in 2008). 
 Considering the first similarity, it seems to make intrinsic sense that a presidential 
hopeful would seek a seat on the Foreign Affairs Committee: presidents, in their role as 
Head of State, are expected to be masters of foreign policy, and being a member of the 
Senate's Committee on said subject certainly acts to burnish one's foreign policy 
credentials.  Not surprisingly, Wanless found serving on the Committee had a positive (+) 
coefficient associated with it (meaning, if a senator was serving on the Committee, they 
were more likely than those who were not to enter into a presidential race).53  Likely, 
Kennedy and Obama both sought a seat on Foreign Relations looking ahead to a future 
presidential run. 
52Wanless, Emily Orchard. 2011. Moving on Up: Political Ambition and the Timing of Decisions to Run for 




                                                          
 
 
 For the nontraditional trait studied by Wanless, the regression again showed a 
positive correlation between being a nontraditional candidate and emerging as a 
presidential contender.  Wanless postulates that this occurs as those individuals who are 
nontraditional and have managed to become senators must have an unusually potent form 
of progressive ambition.  Wanless adds, "Being a minority may increase your viability in 
certain segments of the population, facilitating the assemblage of a multi-ethnic 
coalition."54This is a novel take on what is conventionally considered a mighty handicap. 
 The other quantitative-based article I wanton explore is Sarah A. Treul's 
"Ambition and Party Loyalty in the U.S. Senate.”  Treul explored the relationship 
between a senator's degree of party loyalty and the corresponding likelihood that the 
senator will choose to exercise progressive ambition and run for president.  Treul 
formulates her “rational choice model" for determining the likelihood of a senator 
deciding to run for president: "...it is likely that senators are more prone to make a bid for 
the presidency when the costs of running are low, the candidate has no potential 
liabilities, and the candidate is risk acceptant."55 
 Considering each of the three premises of Treul's choice model, it would appear 
that both candidates Kennedy and Obama fit her formula.  Concerning the costs of 
running, Kennedy had family money to run his race; Obama himself had sedulously 
cultivated Hollywood donors and possessed the foresight to recruit advisers who 
constructed a savvy internet donation machine. As well, both men were prepared to 
absorb the costs of running a national campaign.  As for liabilities, neither senator was 





                                                          
 
 
distinction -and thus were not concerned with potentially jeopardizing their service as a 
chairman.  Senator Tom Daschle, in 2004 the Majority Leader of the Senate, considered a 
run for the presidency in 2004 but decided against it because he found that his personal 
desire to run for president was severely conflicting with his duties and responsibilities as 
a Senate leader.56  Thus, another advantage of youth in the Senate; the cost to run is 
lower as a chairmanship is not on the line. 
 Treul's concept of risk acceptance is tied to the question of liability.  If there is 
little liability (as was the case for Kennedy and Obama), then there is inherently less risk 
to run.  Wanless' argument was rooted more in this concept of risk acceptance, as she was 
studying whether a senator chose to run (emerge) or not.  Both Kennedy and Obama 
could accept the risks, because at worst, they would be able to return to their positions in 
the Senate with a greater national profile than before (and potentially a cabinet position or 
vice presidential slot in the offing as a reward for their efforts).  In 1956, JFK did actively 
campaign for the vice presidential nomination at the convention and was narrowly 
defeated.    
 Of course, Treul did not pen her article explicitly considering the JFK/BHO 
question, but her regressions are rare examples of quantitative research done to study the 
concrete variables that determine why senators run for and achieve the presidency.  
Further quantitative research is required to identify variables which contribute to senators 
successfully running for the presidency.  Of course, we can study the striking common 
factors of Harding, Kennedy, and Obama, but without a robust quantitative analysis of 




                                                          
 
 
which to build conclusions.  A regression built upon independent variables selected as 
electoral characteristics of the senatorial candidates (e.g. whether the senator is a 
minority/nontraditional candidate, how many terms they have served in the senate, 
whether they have sat on the Foreign Relations Committee) and the dependent variable of 
how far candidates with the prescribed traits progressed in their respective campaigns for 
presidents, would be invaluable to actually defining using quantitative analysis what traits 
best enable senators to run successfully for higher office. 
 The most insightful quantitative analysis would be expanded to encompass time, 
adding independent variables to determine how far into the presidential campaign (e.g. 
declaring candidacy, running in the primaries, winning the primaries, being selected as a 
running mate on the ticket, and winning the general election)a senator progresses.  In this 
way, one could determine the degree of significance each individual independent variable 
held for a candidate's ultimate electoral prospects (e.g. does being a minority candidate 
bestow a senator with a greater chance of success than having served on the Foreign 
Relations Committee?) through both analyzing the coefficient (slope/rate of change) of 
each independent variable and then also putting the independent variables into the context 
of their respective correlation with what stage of the campaign an owner of that trait 
typically progresses to. 
 
II. How JFK and BHO Actuated Their Hyper Progressive Ambition 
 
 In the previous section we explored the context in which senators Kennedy and 
Obama began their efforts to achieve the presidency. In this section, we shall take 





Obama campaigns crafted their strategies to negate their weaknesses and bolster their 
strengths; how their perceived disadvantages were morphed into narrative-warping 
political weapons to achieve electoral victory. In the process, we hope to demonstrate that 
Schlesinger's original distinction between the “how” and the “why” was not accurate, and 
that, in politics, the “how” and the “why” cannot be separated but are actually one in the 
same - one acting upon the other. For example, then-Senator Obama may not have been 
politically activated were it not for his racial minority status; as well, he may not have 
been able to win the presidency without that very status. 
It will be demonstrated how candidates Kennedy and Obama maximized the traits 
life had dealt them (their “who” markers) and turned them into the powerful 
branding/identity markers that helped propel them to electoral victory. We hope to show 
that in ambition and politics, the chicken and the egg cannot be separated, that identity is 
destiny, and that Kennedy and Obama could not have scored the stunning political upsets 
they did without the distinctive minority identities they possessed by birth.  As well, their 
youthful status as young senators ultimately served them quite well in the presidential 
election campaigns of '60 and '08. 
A. Minorities as Leader: Kennedy's Religion and Obama's Race 
i. Mitigating Strategies for Minority ‘Disadvantages’ 
 Both senators Obama and Kennedy were minority candidates in a national 
campaign (an African American and a Catholic, respectively).Robert Smith, in his work, 
John F. Kennedy, Barack Obama, and the Politics of Ethnic Incorporation and 
Avoidance, explored the unique “ethnic incorporation and avoidance" the two men had to 





history that an "ethnic" American-a nonwhite Anglo-Saxon Protestant-has been elected 
president."57The other one, of course, was JFK.  Smith interprets the two candidates' 
campaigns as attempts to seemingly gloss over their “otherness" by emphasizing their 
more unifying features. 
Stuckey, Curry, and Barnes (to be referred to as 'Stuckey') collaborated out of 
Georgia State University to create an insightful exploration of the elections of Kennedy 
and Obama. They explored how each candidate brought their respective minority groups 
into the national political mainstream.  Stuckey declared succinctly that minority 
candidates must minimize and marginalize their minority status to voters. She then goes 
on to explain the different rhetorical strategies the candidates employed to accomplish 
this goal.   
Stuckey opined that the “central problem for a minority candidate" is the “need to 
articulate national appeals, to represent the entire nation.”58  Stuckey pounds this theme 
home: a minority candidate for president must minimize, minimize, and minimize the 
significance of their minority status in their campaigns. Minority candidates must do this 
so that they can make a plausible argument that they will adequately represent not just 
their minority group but the majority.59 
 Smith builds his case by elucidating what he viewed as the primary stratagem of 
Kennedy's campaign: "Kennedy's 1960 campaign was to a great extent based on 
marketing a narrative of a handsome, charismatic, youthful, gallant, cool celebrity with a 
57 Smith, Robert C., 1. 
58Stuckey, Mary E., Kristina E. Curry, and Andrew D. Barnes. 2010. "Bringing Candidacies in from the 





                                                          
 
 
thrilling rhetoric of change, a new generation leadership committed to "getting the 
country moving again." Charisma and change were also the "master narratives" of 
Obama's campaign."60Smith suggests that, in order to negate the potentially negative 
effects of running as a minority, such a candidate (e.g. Kennedy and Obama) has sought 
to couch to their campaign rhetoric in terms of hope (a generally positive emotion) and 
change (which is undeniably what a first-time minority candidate seeking the presidency 
will bring to the nation).  Smith’s point reinforces the electoral significance of the 
variables Wanless explored in her study of senators emerging into a presidential race 
(Wanless found the 'nontraditional' variable to have a positive correlation when they 
emerge meaning that being a minority candidate in 2008 meant you were more likely to 
run than the mean candidate).   
 Smith also pinpointed the similarities in Kennedy’s and Obama's campaign 
strategy of focusing on “feel-good” rhetoric: both campaigns took great pains to not 
become encumbered by minute five-point plans on what they would do if elected 
president.61Both senators offered paucity of detail as to their future administrations' 
policy proposals once in office.  Rather, they built their campaigns on the experience of 
electing a young, telegenic, unencumbered senator to the highest office in the land.  This 
proved, against the aged and experienced senators (e.g. Humphrey and Johnson for 
Kennedy; Clinton and McCain for Obama), a smashingly successful recipe for electoral 
victory. Both Kennedy and Obama gave seminal speeches that were designed to 
“mainstream" their candidacies, grappling with their minority status while simultaneously 





                                                          
 
 
Kennedy's moment came on Sept. 12, 1960: "...the candidate gave a major speech to the 
Greater Houston Ministerial Association, a group of Protestant ministers, on the issue of 
his religion."62In this speech, Kennedy called for America to stay faithful to its historical 
roots of religious liberty, declaring "I believe in an America that is officially neither 
Catholic, Protestant, nor Jewish."63 
Similarly, Obama's moment of truth came on March 18, 2008, with his "A More 
Perfect Union" Speech, given at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia.  In 
responding to concerns that he was too radical for American race relations, based upon 
the opinions of his pastor, Rev. Wright, "Like Kennedy, Obama makes the issue one of 
ideals versus practice-if voters truly adhere to the fundamental ideals of America, their 
best choice is to practice those ideals by voting for and mainstreaming the minority 
candidate."64 
Stuckey clearly believes that being a minority candidate is a major handicap in a 
presidential campaign; however, she identifies certain factors that “open the door" to a 
minority candidate making a triumphant run: "Such a context includes economic factors, 
the lack of an incumbent, the presence of new technology, and the ability to plausibly 
argue for the presence of a crisis.  All these render the status quo less desirable, and make 
broadening the mainstream rhetorically and politically possible."65 
 Reiterating Victor’s earlier point, Stuckey also notes that the longer a senator 
serves, the more ossified their candidate identity becomes for a presidential contest; ergo, 
the less well-known a minority candidate is, the better they may be able to fashion their 






                                                          
 
 
image to capture cross-demographic appeal.  As Stuckey explained, "Interestingly, the 
less well-known a candidate is, the easier it may be to accomplish this 
mainstreaming...Beginning with a blank slate, his {Obama's} inventional possibilities 
were correspondingly greater."66  From a branding perspective, if one is Catholic or 
black, the less associated you are with that 'brand', the more potential you have to rebrand 
yourself to the majority electorate (the Protestants and Caucasian American, 
respectively). Of course, a minority may have a very devoted following from members of 
his own minority group, in which case, it is imperative to both portray oneself as a 
mainstream candidate while maintaining the loyalty of your minority base.67 
 Moyer's Not Just Civil Religion builds on this vein of thought by investigating the 
underlying rhetorical inventions the presidents following World War II have utilized in 
framing their religious convictions within the existing American theological framework.  
Kennedy may have paved the way for candidate Obama in the way he successfully 
privatized, and thus effectively compartmentalized, his Catholicism. As Moyer wrote, 
"Kennedy's privatization of his Catholicism was a rhetorical invention that had yet to be 
seen in U.S. political discourse."68In this way, Kennedy reoriented the public's perception 
of his Catholicism from an “other" to merely a piece of the greater American quilt.   
 Moyer and Stuckey both focused on the ways the candidates minimized the 
significance of their minority status.  For Obama, this meant disowning the more 
traditional, separatist views of Reverend Wright. "Obama...violated the aspirations of 
black liberation by refiguring its vision from its ethnic particularity to a universal, or 
66Ibid. 419. 
67Ibid. 419. 
68Moyer, Jason Ray. 2012. "Not just Civil Religion: Theology in the Cases of Woodrow Wilson, John 
Kennedy, and Barack Obama."U of Iowa: 86. 
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inclusive vision of hope."69Obama, like Kennedy, surmised that the best strategy for 
achieving the presidency was to run as a candidate for all Americans, not as a candidate 
that would represent solely his niche interest group. 
  ii. Luck: Happy Advantages JFK and Obama Happened to Have  
 Thus, both candidates effectively neutralized their minority status by reframing 
their campaigns as steps in the natural progression of American democracy towards “a 
more perfect union.”  This alleviated concerns that their empowerment would lead to de-
stability.  Kennedy and Obama, according to Stuckey, were so successful in 
mainstreaming their candidacies because they had the advantages of 1.an economic 
downturn, 2. No incumbent present in the election, and 3. The presence of new 
technology, or disruptive innovation (see Chapter I of the thesis), that revolutionized the 
electoral process.   
   a. The Economy   
 Stuckey, in his work Bringing Candidacies in from the Cold: Mainstreaming 
Minority Candidates, 1960 and 2008,introduces a new variable: the economic climate at 
the time of the election.  For example, unemployment was higher in 1960 than in 1956, 
and in 2008 there existed a crisis mode brought on by the Great Recession.70Thus, both 
JFK and BHO benefited from a weakened economy as it eroded voters' confidence in the 
status quo, thus opening them up psychologically to a minority, or “new,” type of leader.  
This voter mentality dovetails nicely with a “hope and change" message, as voters are 






                                                          
 
 
b. Absence of an Incumbent 
The absence of an incumbent speaks to the scenario in which candidates for the 
presidency do not find themselves racing against an incumbent for the Oval Office.  Both 
Kennedy and Obama found themselves running in the general election against a man who 
had never held the presidency himself (then-Vice President Richard Nixon and Senator 
John McCain, respectively).  If running as a minority candidate is an electoral handicap, 
then at least not having to run against an incumbent was a significant advantage that both 
Kennedy and Obama enjoyed.  Stuckey states that the lack of an incumbent's presence 
opens the door to a “non-mainstream" candidate making a push.71 
 
c. Disruptive Innovation of 1960: Television; 2008: The
 Internet 
  
 Kennedy took advantage of television to stunning effect in his first presidential 
debate against then-Vice President Nixon, whereas "...Obama's campaign made superb 
use of the Internet...as well as from the astute use of standard media tactics."72Stuckey's 
final point of crisis presence is tied to the economic point: she notes that Kennedy played 
up the looming Cold War crisis and Obama campaigned on the Iraq and Afghan wars, as 
examples again of how the status quo (read: majority) leadership of the country had 
repeatedly failed to manage (yet another reason why a record of service on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee would be a great sell).73    d. 
Youth/ Sex Appeal 






                                                          
 
 
into the Kennedy and Obama presidential campaigns: Primary and By the People, 
respectively.  Primary followed the Kennedy and Humphrey campaigns as they wound 
through the Wisconsin primaries of 1960.  Viewing this video cassette was particularly 
relevant as the author was not alive to witness the charisma that was the Kennedy 
campaign of 1960.  Humphrey, the seasoned legislator, appears as old and stodgy, 
juxtaposed against the virile and pulchritudinous Kennedy.  Humphrey was very 
unambiguous in listing his agricultural points, whereas Kennedy was wonderfully vague, 
alluding to the approaching dangers of communism.  Perhaps the most striking 
juxtaposition of Primary was the image of Humphrey wandering around a Wisconsinite 
town awkwardly handing out business cards whilst Kennedy was mobbed by teenagers 
demanding a signed photograph.   
 By the People’s most poignant moment involves an Obama volunteer who 
proudly declares that Obama is the first candidate he has felt impassioned enough to 
campaign for since Bobby Kennedy in 1968.  Obama is a rock star in the film, his chief 
strategists noting fondly that, whereas most presidential campaigns must spend time and 
money introducing their candidates to the American people, the Obama campaign started 
with an already famous candidate.74The Obama volunteer who noted the striking 
similarities between Obama and the JFK/RFK duo was not alone, for he was consuming a 
manufactured image that the Obama machine had assiduously fashioned and distributed. 
 B. Obama's Play: Appropriation of Kennedy's Camelot 
 Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts determined that Barack Hussein Obama 
would make the best heir to his brother’s legacy.  He and niece Caroline Kennedy 
74By the People. Directed by Amy Rice, Alicia Sam’s, Edward Norton, et al. S.I.: Pivotal Pictures :Culver 
City, CA, 2010; 2009. 
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anointed Obama at American University, echoing a famous foreign policy speech of 
JFK’s. Senator Kennedy quoted his slain brother by saying the time had come “for a new 
generation of leadership.”75Obama, while prudently accepting the endorsements, was also 
determined not to simply be typecast as JFK 2.0.  As David Axelrod, Obama’s master 
strategist, put it, “But every candidate has to stand on his own, or her own.  So the thing 
we are careful not to imply is that there is some sort of transference, and that somehow if 
the Kennedys lay hands on Obama then he then wears the mantle.  That would be 
presumptuous and wrong."76  Obama did not want to be typecast by the Clinton or 
McCain campaigns as an empty suit with no substance but that which the Kennedy aura 
transferred unto him; he knew he already had a credibility gap when it came to real 
experience and substance.   
 As well, Obama’s entire campaign was predicated on hope and change, very 
future-oriented platforms on which to construct a push for the presidency.  Had Obama 
merely rested on the laurels of the Kennedy coronation, he would have been basing his 
brand principally on the Camelot of the 1960s.  As candidates Kennedy and Obama 
knew, one of the keys to their victories was their brands’ forward-looking orientation, 
thus sidestepping the requisite requirements for experience and time served.  However, as 
Roger Black explains in his article “Obama or Kennedy?” Obama was able to appropriate 
JFK’s imagery because the endorsements he received from Caroline and Ted Kennedy 
shielded him from overt criticism that he was using the Kennedy image.77 
 Ruth Connifffurther discussed the candidates’ efforts to mainstream their attempts 
75Smith, Chris. 2008. "The Honorary Kennedy." New York 41 (21): 20: 1. 
76Ibid. 2. 
77"Obama or Kennedy?" 2008.Creative Review 28 (8): 64. 
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to appeal to the majority of Americans by providing more substance about how this 
process actually plays out.  "As a Rorschach, Obama reflects Americans' best feelings 
about themselves-a sight better than what we have now."78As Kennedy and Obama 
sought to appeal to the largest possible audience, they sagaciously spoke in platitudes that 
encouraged voters to fill in the gaps to fit their own desired interpretations of each man.  
Echoing Stuckey’s exploration of the significance of the selection of our national leaders, 
‘A JFK For Our Times’ notes that "A country defines itself by its leadership, and electing 
a minority figure as chief executive is a significant milestone."79 
 While both Kennedy and Obama were minority candidates, both men endured 
minute probing concerning their religion. For example, Kennedy was grilled on how his 
Catholicism would color his decisions in the Oval Office, whereas Obama was 
incorrectly presumed to be a Muslim by nearly 1/5 of all Americans, according to a PEW 
poll taken in 2010.80This idea of an “other” candidate is an interesting phenomenon. 
They were ultimately successful in their bids for the presidency by effectively redefining 
what it meant to be an American in a position of power in the United States of America.  
This sense of potential and possibility may be why American voters flock to candidates 
like them. The minority candidate may be the average American’s best chance to queer 
the power structure, to support the contender who, like them, is not supposed to win the 
big prize, but with the support of the people, truly can. 
i. Frame: The Fetishization of the American Presidency 
 The aforementioned sources dealing with the question of Obama's position as an 
78Conniff, Ruth. 2007. "Obama's Kennedy Bid." Progressive 71 (6): 14: 3. 
79"A JFK for our Times." 2008.Maclean's 121 (45): 2: 1. 
80Falsani, Cathleen. 2011. "Kennedy and Obama: The Faith Question." Sojourners Magazine 40 (1): 14: 2. 
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heir to the “Kennedy Mystique" were articles predominately composed in the period of 
2007-08, in the midst of Obama's compelling presidential run. Of particular note is the 
impressive representation British scholars made to the collections. One particularly 
fascinating British account of the Kennedy-Obama duality on the Freudian level was 
made by Gregory Frame of the University of Warwick, United Kingdom.  Frame 
theorized that the U.S. craves a father figure and has placed this subconscious onus onto 
its presidents.  As JFK was cut down before his time, his image is frozen in place as an 
ideal president/father figure, as it has never been besmirched by the same degree of 
judgment most presidents ultimately face.  Frame theorizes that candidate Obama 
appropriated this Kennedy Mystique to make himself appear presidential and to wear the 
Kennedy mantle.81 
 Frame claims that the brand of the Obama campaign was ripped right out of the 
JFK playbook: "In semiotic terms, the similarities between the two men are inescapable: 
like Kennedy, Obama is youthful, attractive, with a young family, and he appears 
similarly concerned with exuding sartorial elegance in his public appearances...the 
Obama presidency is clearly indebted to the Kennedy legacy: elegant, stylish, disguising 
an enormous intellect beneath the veneer of relaxed sophistication."82Frame is implying 
that Obama saw in Kennedy a tested and effective presidential model, one that, due to his 
similarities to JFK (Harvard-educated, young senator, etc.) would fit himself 
efficaciously.   
 I sense in Frame’s work the implication that in co-opting Kennedy's style, Obama 





                                                          
 
 
and Holmes' theory that minority candidates must mainstream their candidacies, it would 
make sense that Obama would seek to appear as “white" as possible to dissemble his 
blackness, and thus his “otherness.”  I believe this trope requires thorough qualitative 
research to incorporate race, queer, and postmodern theory in order to be adequately 
explored. 
 Frame warns that both men came to signify not candidates for president but actual 
fetishes for the American father figure.  As Frame wrote, "The fetishization of his 
{Kennedy's} image...describes as 'The Kennedy Obsession'...in relation to our own 
fixation with the representations of the Obamas."83Many noted in 2007-08 a similarly 
fervent “Obama Obsession” sweeping the public.  Both men appeared to become fetish 
props, with people ultimately voting for them not because of their policy stances (which 
both candidates kept deliberately murky), but for their symbolic significance (attractive 
young statesmen that came to represent Freudian father-absence of the highest and most 
potent order).  As Robert Smith warned in his aforementioned Politics of Ethnic 
Incorporation and Avoidance, "Yet we know that in both Kennedy's and Obama's cases 
that much of the success of their narratives rested on manufactured images, rhetoric, 
political posturing, and an all-too-frequent fawning press corps...Thomas Reeves 
concluded by warning, ‘...the American people must resist the temptation to be won over 
by a handsome face, expensive campaign efforts, and thrilling rhetoric.’  In 2008 as in 
1960 this resistance proved too big an ask."84The ultimate marketing campaign resulted 
in Americans possibly electing an advertisement as opposed to an actual man to the 
presidency. 
83Ibid. 165. 
84Smith, Robert C., 104. 
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 Thus, both Kennedy and Obama were candidate soul mates of a sort, and it seems 
certain that Obama actively cultivated this perception.  Frame argues that Obama and his 
campaign advisors were well aware of the public's fascination with him in relation to 
Kennedy, explaining, "It is arguable that, through the similar implementation of a star 
image, Obama presented himself as the man who would ultimately fulfill the promise of 
Kennedy's curtailed presidency, becoming the son to Kennedy's father...To paraphrase 
Obama's own campaign rhetoric, was he the one we had been waiting for?"85  Of course, 
Frame was not the only person who gazed upon the Obama campaign and saw in his 
ethos the echoes of Camelot. 
  ii. Sorensen: Personality and Purpose Trumps     
  Seniority/Experience 
 
 Ted Sorensen, JFK's senatorial advisor and eventual presidential advisor, gushes 
in his article “Heir Time” on the like-comportments of JFK and BHO. Sorensen believed 
that in 2008 Obama was the candidate the country needed to unify it and revive American 
liberalism, the role he believes Kennedy successfully played in 1960.  He noted that both 
candidates were lampooned for their thin resumes, quoting his old boss on the campaign 
trail, "Experience is like tail-lights on a boat which illuminate where we have been when 
we should be focusing on where we should be going."86Both Kennedy and Obama spun a 
like narrative: the fresh and brilliant young face riding into Washington on a white horse 
to reinvigorate the Republic and lead it to a bright new destiny (Kennedy's “Camelot" 
imagery).   





                                                          
 
 
their all-star performances at the previous Democratic National Conventions (Kennedy in 
his bid for the vice presidential slot in 1956; Obama as a keynote speaker at the 2004 
Convention).87He also, as Frame and Smith had opined, noted that both Kennedy and 
Obama drafted nondescript presidential plans, "Kennedy's speeches in 1960 and even 
earlier, like Obama's in early 2007, were not notable for their five-point legislative plans.  
Rather, they focused on several common themes: hope, a determination to succeed 
despite the odds, dissatisfaction with the status quo, and confidence in the judgment of 
the American people...neither talked down to the American people."88Here, Sorensen 
makes the distinctive point that the electoral success these two men enjoyed was born 
from their respect of the American people. They did not proselytize complex policy 
points (a la Victor's prediction that tenured senators fail as presidential candidates 
because they cannot help but speak 'senatorese' to voters). 
 Sorensen concludes by noting the repeated failure of tenured senators to recognize 
the potent appeal this “simplified" campaign talk can have on the American voting 
public. I would extrapolate from Sorensen's and others' observations that the very genius 
of JFK and BHO was that their inexperience strengthened their appeal to the voting 
public while simultaneously duping their more experienced and powerful senatorial 
adversaries.  As Sorensen succinctly waxes, “Most of Kennedy's opponents, like 
Obama's, were fellow senators...who initially dismissed him as neither a powerhouse on 
the Senate floor nor a member of their inner circle.  That mattered not to the voters; nor 






                                                          
 
 
adversaries make the grievous miscalculation of fatally underestimating them.  Ironically, 
Kennedy and Obama's lack of real power in the Senate proved a most opaque cloak with 
which to camouflage themselves for the presidential contests.    
III. Devil's Advocate 
 A. Context 1960 vs. 2008 
 The similarities between JFK and BHO’s opponents for president have been 
explored in the critical review: in summary, seasoned and tenured senators against the 
audacious young senators.  However, no research, qualitative or quantitative-based, has 
sought to root out the differences between the opponents JFK faced in 1960 and those 
against BHO in 2008. Were the primary challengers of Senators Humphrey and Johnson 
analogous to the resistance of Senators Clinton and Edwards that Obama faced?  We 
would argue that Senator Clinton was a much more established threat than was 
Humphrey in the 1960 primary season. 
 Furthermore, the nominating process at the Democratic Conventions of 1960 and 
2008 were worlds apart.  In 1960, a candidate could conceivably not even run in the 
Democratic primaries and still maneuver to become the party candidate at the convention 
(as LBJ had schemed to accomplish).  This was near the exact opposite in the 2008 
primaries, where once Obama achieved the number of delegates necessary to clinch the 
nomination at the convention, incredible pressure built on Clinton to withdraw from the 
campaign to allow the presumptive nominee to move swiftly to the general campaign.  
JFK and BHO were operating under different nominating rules when they achieved their 
electoral victories, and to not recognize and account for these significant differences is to 





facing Vice President Nixon of 1960 vs. Senator McCain in 2008).However, the 
similarities between the two candidates are strikingly fantastic (e.g. Stuckey’s points).  
Thus, the perspective of focusing on the similarities does bear out.   
 B. The young wunderkind as a candidate type 
 With the 2016 presidential election already becoming a focal point for political 
conversation, self-declared presidential hopeful senators Ted Cruz and Rand Paul could 
potentially take stock from how JFK and BHO ran their presidential campaigns.  The 
campaign techniques and styles they used may prove transferable to other electoral 
paradigms for young senators (i.e. serving on the Foreign Relations Committee and/or not 
serving in a senate leadership position).  Furthermore, no research has been done on the 
relative effects or ‘bumps’ each quality gives to a senator in a presidential campaign (or, 
more simply, does serving on the Foreign Relations Committee confer a greater or lesser 
benefit than, say, being a minority candidate?).   
  i. What Significance, if any, did their status as youthful senators have  
  on their abilities to run a successful presidential campaign? 
 Both Obama and Kennedy were young senators who outfoxed and defeated more 
seasoned senior senators in presidential combat.  While qualitatively this was extensively 
remarked upon and analyzed, no significant quantitative analysis existed to explain this 
phenomenon.  Quantitative questions such as: how would the dependent variable: success 
in a presidential campaign measured against the independent variables (e.g. age of the 
senator, number of years served in the Senate, leadership positions held within the 
Senate, etc.).  Any serious investigation into the similarities between Kennedy and 





study of how their Senatorial attributes augmented their campaign capabilities. 
  ii. The role of technology in the campaign successes of the two men 
 The efficacious results of the use of modern technology by both the Kennedy and 
Obama campaigns has been lauded in qualitative analyses as one of the principal reasons 
both candidates were able to emerge victorious in their respective elections.  However, as 
with the last question, no real quantitative analysis of this phenomenon has been 
attempted.  The dependent variable -efficacy of the technological tool -could be studied 
via the independent variables - for example, age of the technology, cost of implementing 
the technology, rate of saturation of the technology within the political system, number of 
people the technology can/does communicate with, number of opponent candidates who 
also are utilizing the said technology, etc..  While we have talked of the power of the 
televised candidate debate in giving Kennedy a boost against Nixon in 1960, the stunning 
success of micro donations that the internet brought to the Obama campaign of 2008, and 
the targeted advertising of the Obama campaign of 2012, no real quantitative study of 
these sundry technological advantages or developments seemingly exists. 
IV. Conclusion 
 Presidents John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Barack Hussein Obama both overcame 
their minority status to capture the United States Presidency.  Through their multiple 
shared inborn and developed political skills/traits, this paper sought to demonstrate just 
how similar these two politicians were to each other and how different they were from all 
other typical politicians.  In this way, we hope to have brought home the ‘uniqueness’ 
factor of hyper progressive ambition theory: few politicians fit into the category because 





and Obama, their minority status -to catapult them ahead of their peers in the presidential 
contest.  Thus, both JFK and Obama were both intensely unique and successful 
politicians, thus cementing their status as hyper progressive politicians, the political 
nature of which is outlined in Chapter II. 
 Chapters I and II outlined the characteristics of candidates Kennedy and Obama 
and how these characteristics set them apart from the average progressively ambitious 
politician.  Progressing, chapter III will examine how a hyper progressive politician 
performs once in higher office.  It will be highlighted that, while their dazzling campaign 
skills did secure them electoral victory, their very swift ascent through the rungs of 
political office does result in a politician who, while an adroit campaigner, is not prepared 
to effectively handle a presidential transition and subsequent early crisis. 
 As a little divertissimo, David L. Holmes interestingly asserts that Barack Obama 
actually received a greater quantity (three years to JFK's one) of formal Roman Catholic 
schooling.90Often, being a “nontraditional" candidate does not signify a monolithic 
political perspective, as is often maintained by the American media and general populace.  
Moyer suggests that minority candidates may actually by virtue of their “other" status 
make ideal leaders, as he expounds, "... when holding two competing perspectives 
simultaneously a development is produced, a kind of synthesis, that should not be treated 
as relativistic but as a "perspective of perspectives".91This “perspective of perspectives" 
may gird the candidate with a holistic viewpoint that can most accurately absorb and 
synthesize the myriad issues that confront the modern American Republic.   
90Holmes, David L. 2012. The Faiths of the Postwar Presidents: From Truman to Obama. George H. 
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Chapter III: The Hyper Progressive Politician as an Ascendant 
Leader 
 
I. Introduction  
In the previous two chapters the existence and characteristics of the American 
hyper progressive politician were both established and studied by examining of the 
American presidents John F. Kennedy and Barack H. Obama.  The question now is: how 
do such politicians execute their presidential transitions?  Do such politicians establish 
similar and predictable decision making processes?  More specifically, using the red flags 
framework of the decision making work Think Again, we can discover what errors hyper 
progressive politicians in the United States’ highest office typically commit. Does their 
decision making process incorporate a robust risk management structure to control for the 
myriad risks and rewards that any new president must contend with?  And finally, in each 
president’s first crisis, does the system produce a desirable outcome?  This question's 
significance extends beyond the current Obama administration to potential 
administrations of a future hyper progressive politician that may triumph in the 2016 
presidential contest. 
 It has been surmised from the earlier chapters that Presidents JFK and BHO (John 
F. Kennedy and Barack H. Obama) were hyper progressively ambitious politicians, 
actualizing sophisticated and original campaigning techniques (how they won) and 
possessing certain advantageous characteristics (why then ran), identifying them as such.  
In the earlier chapters it was explored why they displayed hyper progressive ambition - 
e.g. their penultimate office of senator prior to running for the presidency -as well as how 





modifying Schlesinger's distinction between the “how” and “whom” of achieving higher 
office, it was demonstrated that the "how" and “whom” of hyper progressive ambition are 
not mutually exclusive domains, but actually form a circuitous relationship in that both 
factors co-currently act upon each other. 
Thus, in the first two chapters the striking similarities in the candidacies down to 
the sartorial style of each man was noted and examined; in this chapter, it will be probed 
how the two transitioned to the highest office in the land.  It is hypothesized that two 
preeminent variables pull my examples towards and away from having similar 
administrative preparation results.  On the one hand, both men had a paucity of legislative 
experience compared to their most significant competitors for the presidency, to give one 
example of the sundry similitudes; on the other, one transitioned to his administration in 
the period of 1960-61, the other 2008-09.  In that time, the Presidential Transition Act of 
1963 was passed, critically altering the resources with which presidents-elect may 
prepare for their administrations. 
 Thus, to properly examine the efficacy of both mens' transition process, and to 
attempt to control for the time period in which both men happened to serve, each early 
administration will be examined via the vehicle of an early crisis in the respective 
administration.  For President Kennedy, the Bay of Pigs; for President Obama, the 
passage of ARRA (The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).In both these 
cases, the presidents made critical decisions that reflected upon the processes they had 
put in place beforehand to best prepare them to make such a calls. 
It is important for me to note that it is not this paper’s assumption that JFK and 





Governors Clinton and Carter (both future presidents) shared the same penchant ask JFK 
and BHO for achieving the presidency well ahead of the age curve (see Chapter I: 
Appendix).  However, this thesis investigates Kennedy and Obama because their many 
biographical similarities and similar outcomes make them perfect candidates for such a 
cross-comparison, a comparison that spans across an approximately 50 year span (1960-
2008). 
 An organization's decision making structure is the process by which an 
organization weighs the predictable risks and rewards of a particular decision/ action.  
Just having a formalized decision making structure does not make the procedure either 
'good' or 'bad'; rather, a decision making structure may be rated by examining the degree 
of risk management implemented in the process. 
 Risk management is simply the reasoned balance of potential risks and rewards 
when making a decision.  For instance, an organization that focused chiefly on short-term 
profit gain (rewards) to the detriment of ignoring warnings from its CRO (chief risk 
officer) concerning investment risks, would not have an effective risk management 
procedure in place and consequently could be considered to not have a balanced e.g. 
'good' decision making structure as well.  Basically, incorporating risk management into 
the decision making process requires the reasoned consideration of the dangers and 
benefits that may come from a decision. 
 Woven into this exploration will be the grading of how well (if at all) each 
president built into their decision making process risk management to protect against 
potentially egregious decision making errors such as groupthink or bad information. How 





against such failures will reflect how well a hyper progressive politician can transition 
from a candidate to an efficient and effective leader. 
 During the 1960 presidential primary campaign season, Senator Johnson noted 
that Senator Kennedy was off from the Senate politicking via kissing babies while he, the 
responsible public servant and Majority Leader, was wiling away precious campaign time 
stewarding legislation through the Congress.  This anecdote that is, per Dr. Ginsburg of 
Johns Hopkins University, illustrative of a characteristic indicative of the hyper 
progressive politicians: they make great campaigners, but potentially not as slick leaders.  
Dr. Ginsburg posited two severely diverging paths for such a candidate that does reach 
the zenith of their political ambition: 1. what do I do now?  The candidate-turned leader 
fails to produce the ability to lead effectively, or 2. Rise to the occasion.  The candidate 
backs up a scintillating campaign performance with an equally efficacious showing in 
higher office.92 
 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine which of these freshman 
senators might be classifiable as a hyper progressive politician, if one were to emerge as 
such and ultimately capture the presidency, knowledge of how past hyper progressive 
politicians-turned-presidents had managed their transitions would prove invaluable in 
formulating a risk management strategy that sought to mitigate the potentiality for costly 
errors as was experienced by President Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs crisis. 
 Finally, based upon the findings from the above points, this chapter will have set 
the groundwork for envisioning what kind of a presidency might emerge from the 
electoral success of a hyper progressive politician in 2016.  Currently, a slew of freshman 
92Ginsberg, Dr. Benjamin. Thoughts on Paul McCoy's Master’s Thesis. 
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senators e.g. Rubio, Paul, Cruz, and Warren, have been noted by political operatives as 
potential candidates for the presidency in 2016.  In the Conclusion, the nature of a future 
hyper progressive presidential transition will be considered. 
A. Historical Background 
Before the analysis of the actions of presidents Kennedy and Obama, relevant 
historical background information will be provided to help put their decisions in context.   
i. Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs 
   
Candidate Kennedy’s degree of knowledge of the Eisenhower administration’s 
covert plan to remove Fidel Castro from power was in the hands of President 
Eisenhower, who chose to not reveal the existence of the plan until after Kennedy’s 
election to the presidency.  As elucidated by Rebecca Friedman in Crisis Management, 
"As a presidential candidate, Kennedy received three briefings from intelligence officials 
in 1960...Although the CIA had no clear policy for briefing presidential candidates, 
briefings often omitted highly sensitive covert actions, signal intelligence, and human 
intelligence programs until after the election."93 
President-elect Kennedy learned of the existence of the CIA plan to overthrow the 
existing Cuban government on November 18, 1960.  President Eisenhower, in his final 
briefing with the President-elect, pressed Kennedy to continue the regime change 
operation that his administration had initiated.94  From the beginning of the Kennedy 
administration, the CIA curtailed the access that Kennedy’s advisers had to relevant 
information.  “The CIA controlled information so tightly that Kennedy’s advisors were 
93Friedman, Rebecca R. 2011. "Crisis Management at the Dead Center: The 1960-1961 Presidential 




                                                          
 
 
not allowed to keep briefing materials; the president did not think to push back when 
Bissell’s team collected them at the end of every meeting.”95 
 According to Friedman, "January 28, 1961: Kennedy receives his first full 
briefing as president on the CIA's Cuban operation and authorizes continuation and 
acceleration of planning."96  At this point, Kennedy had taken ownership of the plan to 
remove Castro from power.  As Friedman spells out, “…There were three basic 
preconditions that Kennedy had set-and on which the CIA, State Department, and 
Department of Defense had all agreed-for the invasion.  There had to be first, plausible 
deniability of American involvement; second, support for a popular uprising against 
Castro; and third, a guerrilla option for the brigade if the operation went awry.  On March 
16, with the plan in nearly final form, it should have been clear that Operation Zapata did 
not meet these prerequisites.”97 
 The Bay of Pigs operation was launched on April 16, 1961.  As considered by 
Friedman, “In practice, the operation did not benefit from a guerilla option, popular 
support, or plausible deniability.”98  While the CIA appealed for more air support, 
President Kennedy would not acquiesce to the request; “Within four days, 89 members of 
the Brigade were killed and 1,197 taken prisoner."99 
  ii. Obama and the Financial Crisis 
 President Obama provided a revealing interview for Rolling Stone magazine in 








                                                          
 
 
“…’there is no doubt that I brought in a bunch of folks who understand the financial 
markets, the same way, by the way, that FDR brought in a lot of folks who understood 
the financial markets after the crash, including Joe Kennedy, because my number-one job 
at that point was making sure that we did not have a full-fledged financial meltdown.’”100  
President Obama saw his appointed advisers truly as the experts best-prepared to stave 
off a meltdown of the American economy. 
According to Suskind in Confidence Men, President Obama had two basic pools 
from which to pull for his economic team: Team A, the more progressive economists 
who had been a major part of his campaign, and Team B, many who had worked in the 
Clinton administration and who were more moderate to their approach in fixing the 
existing system.  Obama ultimately went with Team B and a more cautious, moderate 
approach to building the stimulus, in effect performing a switch-out of his campaign’s 
economic team for a new, presidential one:  
“On Monday, November 24, Obama unveiled his newly minted economic team.  The headline 
names were Summers, Geithner, and Romer.  It was a markedly different group, compositionally 
and ideologically, from the A-Team Obama had showcased throughout his campaign.  Summers 
would take the NEC chair, Geithner the top job at Treasury, and Romer the head role at CEA.  As 
for the members of Team A, they would find themselves exiled to the hastily crafted President’s 
Economic Recovery Advisory Board.”101 
II. Judging the Transitions 
 A. Presidential Goals in Crisis 
 
The Strategic Triangle model taught by C. Roland Christensen of the Harvard 
100Suskind, Ron and James Lurie. 2011. Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington, and the Education of a 




                                                          
 
 
Business School102 is a template by which one can analyze the way three interlocking 
factors interact to result in a goal being successfully achieved.  The three interlocking 
variables are: the goal, that which the individual or organization hopes to accomplish; the 
internal resources are those tools that the decision maker has at their disposal; the 
external actors are those forces that act independently of the primary goal seeker and may 
either help, hinder, or be a neutral actor in the effort to achieve the goal. 
It is critical to identify the goals that Presidents Kennedy and Obama established 
heading into their premier crisis of their young administrations.  By understanding the 
nature of the goals and their relation to one another inside and out of each individual 
crisis, it can be determined how a hyper progressive politician frames their problem 
solving dilemma.  Furthermore, the respective goals of Kennedy and Obama may be 
potentially considered as inappropriate attachments per the red flags template of Think 
Again.   
Finally, this paper will expand upon the concept of a decision maker having a 
single primary goal to include the scenario of a decision maker having two separate and 
potentially non-complimentary goals in action at the same time. In the examples chosen 
to explore the nature of the hyper progressive politician in higher office, both Presidents 
were attempting to actuate two distinct policy goals simultaneously.  This paper argues 
that the reason one president was successful in actuating their primary goal (Obama) and 
the other was not (Kennedy) was not due to their executive skills per se but rather due to 
the fact that in Kennedy’s case his goals were in conflict with one another while for 
Obama one goal did not directly hinder the success of the other. 




                                                          
 
 
i. President Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs: His Goals 
President Kennedy’s primary goal was the overthrow of Fidel Castro from power 
over Cuba.  The internal resources at his disposal were the CIA; (Joint Chiefs of Staff) 
CJS/Pentagon; and finally, his hand-picked advisers within the administration.  The 
external actors were President Fidel Castro as well as the international and domestic 
press. 
In a meeting with the CIA on March 11, 1961, President Kennedy emphasized his 
desire to find a method to overthrow Castro that "...could be accomplished with the least 
amount of political risk."103For the President had another intertwined goal: plausible 
deniability of U.S. involvement in any operation to overthrow President Castro.  The 
resources for Kennedy were the same as his primary goal, and the external actors were as 
well Castro and the world press.  In the end, it was the press that exposed the U.S. 
government’s efforts to enact regime change in Cuba; as well, Kennedy’s advisers failed 
to alert the president to this information leak. 
 However, for President Kennedy the fundamental issue was that Kennedy's goals 
were in conflict with each other.  In order to successfully remove Castro from power, 
Kennedy would have likely have had to call upon U.S. air power to aid the Cuban rebels 
during their landing at the Bay of Pigs.  As Friedman explains, "CIA appeals for more air 
support...were denied by President Kennedy...President Kennedy's decision to cancel the 
second air strike against Castro's air force was likely the mistake that doomed the 





                                                          
 
 
To maintain deniability, Kennedy held back on committing further military 
support, thus sabotaging his primary goal.  As well, his advisers' failure to read the New 
York Times and foreign newspapers meant that Kennedy wasn't even aware that 
plausible deniability had also already been lost; papers in Nicaragua and the New York 
Times had already printed stories linking the Eisenhower administration to plans to 
overthrow Castro's Cuba.105  While the green Kennedy White House was not aware of 
media reports of American involvement with the rebels, it is quite probable that Castro 
would have been.   
ii. President Obama and ARRA: His Goals 
President Obama’s primary goal was to facilitate, following the bailouts of fall 
2008, the fast and effective recovery of the U.S. economy.  His internal resources were 
his hand-picked economic team, led by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and 
Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) Lawrence Summers. The external 
actors were the U.S. Congress, in particular Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, the 
Progressive Democrats, and the opposition Republicans. 
President Obama’s secondary goal was for inspiration in the stimulus bill: during 
his transition team’s first meeting with Obama as President-elect, Obama cried, “There 
needs to be more inspiration here!”106Indeed, on the campaign trail for president 
“…Obama also pledged to upgrade our infrastructure…He was especially keen on new-





                                                          
 
 
public works, not just more public works.”107The President wanted to channel the 
Rooseveltian spirit of 'men and shovels'108, or government investment in national 
infrastructure, for instance smart energy, “…structural transformation and the seeding of 
innovative new industries.”109His internal resources were his economic team, and the 
external actors were again the U.S. Congress. 
While many ultimately considered the stimulus a success in staving off another 
depression, thus achieving the president’s primary goal, his secondary goal was not 
implemented per the President's original specifications; for instance, his desire to see 
smart grids directly incorporated into the stimulus bill was vetoed by his own advisers, as 
it was believed that implementing such a program would require implementation by 
district to district, which was considered unfeasible.110However, President Obama clearly 
prioritized in the case of his two goals; his primary aim was the salvation of the U.S. 
economy.   
The president, aided along by Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, envisioned a 
stimulus that would be a kind of down payment on president’s long-term goals for 
American economic transformation and revival.  Brooking official Bruce Katz captured 
the thinking of the president and Emanuel, “Administrations go fast.  You don't have that 
much time to change things…The narrative coming from the top was: 'Let's make sure 
we take advantage of this disruptive moment."111 
In contrast, Larry Summers, one of his chief economic advisers and a former 
107Grunwald, Michael. 2012. The New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change in the Obama Era Simon 
and Schuster:  






                                                          
 
 
Clinton Secretary of the Treasury, was focused more so on stimulus that was “…timely, 
targeted and temporary stimulus.”112  In other words, long-term economic stimulus, while 
visionary and critical to long-term development, was not in the strategy for Summers. 
The emphasis on the economy over economic innovation or an innovative 
overhaul drove the president’s selection of demonstrably Clintonian and moderate 
economists to his top administration posts.  However, As Skocpol explained in her article 
‘Accomplished and Embattled’:  
Timothy Geithner and Lawrence Summers would lead his White House economic advisory team.  
In a financially induced crisis, Obama believed they were uniquely qualified to figure out where 
reforms were needed-and, perhaps persuade bankers to help the larger economy moving forward.  
But building this kind of economic team-especially given the well-known proclivity of Summers 
taking control of the process of generating policy alternatives-also meant that Obama was not 
going to hear day to day from other kinds of economic experts who thought of jobs first, or who 
saw U.S. economic recovery over the longer term as requiring commitments to structural 
transformation and seeding innovative new industries.113 
Thus, Obama’s second goal, of infusing the stimulus with infrastructure improvements 
was squelched by his economic advisers, the same experts who had been principally 
appointed to tackle the primary goal, the avoidance of an economic depression.  
However, in President Obama's case, one of his two goals could fail without bringing 
down the other.   
 It must be noted that, per triangle model, a goal must be achievable for it to be 





                                                          
 
 
to actualize his goals, stymied Obama and Congressional Democrats in his opposition to 
the stimulus moneys being devoted to a large degree to infrastructure as he believed that 
the president's own goal was not achievable.  As explained by Grabell in Money Well 
Spent,  
The transition team clashed with congressional Democrats over several proposals. While giving 
a presentation on the stimulus at a caucus meeting on January 9, Larry Summers expressed his 
concerns that a heavy investment in infrastructure would take too long to get out the door. 
Representative Jim Oberstar was in the back of the room and grabbed a microphone. Summers 
just didn’t get it, Oberstar said. Transit agencies wouldn’t need to go through the time-
consuming process of awarding new contracts. They already had billions of dollars in pending 
options for new buses and railcars. They just needed money to exercise them.114 
 Summers came at the stimulus with a ruthlessly practical Keynesian mindset.  Per 
Michael Grunwald in his work The New New Deal, "A stimulus package, he [Summers] 
argued, should be timely, targeted, and temporary."115Focused on these guideposts, 
Summers apparently did not understand the intricacies of Congressional budgeting as the 
Congressional Democrats did.  Here again, the inexperience of both Summers and Obama 
came to the fore; all that was needed for infrastructure investments to be made was the 
money to be committed to the appropriate agencies: infrastructure investments were 
'shovel-ready'.  While money would be pumped into infrastructure improvements by the 
ultimate ARRA law, Obama’s entrustment of the steering of the stimulus to Summers and 






                                                          
 
 
iii. Compare and Contrast  
Thus, Obama's chosen advisers were able to facilitate the achieving of his first 
goal, but not the second.  In contrast, Kennedy's advisers could not help him in achieving 
either goal: as will be discussed further in the Red Flags section of this paper, his advisers 
failed to both understand the language of the CIA and Pentagon nor did they come to 
know that the press had already published stories noting the American plans to overthrow 
Castro.  Thus, Kennedy’s advisers failed twice over to properly assist him in achieving 
his desired goals. 
For instance, concerning President Obama and his goal to have an 'inspirational' 
e.g. greater infrastructure investment and allocation of 'seed money' alternative energy 
sources116.In other words, while President Obama did wish to have a greater emphasis on 
infrastructure and renewable energies.  Obama’s greatest failure may not have been his 
selection of more conservative economic advisers, but rather his failure to balance his 
team with more progressive economists and financial experts to aid in his desire and 
campaign pledges to revitalize the U.S. economy via infrastructure renewal and smart 
energy investment.   
 B. Red Flags 
 In order to consider how Presidents Kennedy and Obama responded to their 
respective crisis, it is necessary to use a common framework for evaluating the ultimate 
result.  It is particularly important to establish a consistent methodology for judging the 
risk management and decision making abilities of the two young presidents as Kennedy's 
116Skocpol, Theda and Lawrence R. Jacobs. 2012. "Accomplished and Embattled: Understanding Obama's 
Presidency." Political Science Quarterly (Academy of Political Science) 127 (1): 10. 
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crisis concerned foreign affairs whereas Obama's was in the realm of financial policy.  
Thus, a common framework with which to review the preparatory procedures for the 
Kennedy and Obama decision making process is required to rigorously juxtapose the two 
experiences and draw sound conclusions.  The framework to review these two transition 
processes will be drawn from Think Again by Finkelstein, Whitehead, and Campbell.  In 
this work the authors specified certain variables that determine the success or failure of 
decisions.  
 In Think Again, the authors identified four red flags that can serve as pitfalls to 
sound decision making.  They are:  
1. Misleading Prejudgments 
2. Inappropriate Self-Interest 
3. Misleading Experiences 
4. Inappropriate Attachments117 
 
Prejudgments  are those assumptions one bring to any decision; self-interest might be a 
familial or business connection one has to a problem's outcome; misleading experiences 
are the famous 'general fighting the last war' phenomenon; and attachments might be 
one's infatuation with a program design we ourselves originated.   
 Further, in the course of research it was found necessary to expand upon the 
framework of red flag #3, misleading experiences, to include the presence of 
inexperience in either the president or their transition team and staff.  In my research of 
the Bay of Pigs Crisis and the financial crisis President Obama engaged, very often the 
presidents and their staffs were forced to make critical decisions without the benefit of 
any relevant experience.  In these cases, I will make the distinction between misleading 
117Finkelstein, Sydney, Jo Whitehead, and Andrew Campbell. 2013. Think again: Why Good Leaders make 
Bad Decisions and how to Keep it from Happening to You Harvard Business Press: 173. 
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experience and misleading inexperience. 
 In response to all these potential pitfalls for sound decision making, the authors 
identified four safeguards that assist a decision maker in controlling for the potential red 
flags.  They are:  
1. Experience and Data 
2. Governance 
3. Decision Group and Process 
4. Monitoring 
 
Experience and data are just that: key pieces of information that assist the decision maker 
in realizing that certain assumptions they have made may in fact be factually wrong.  
Governance has to do with how the CEO regulates the information sharing among his 
subordinates. Decision group and process concerns the parameters by which the group of 
advisers deliberates and establishes the ideas/plans that will be funneled up to the 
decision maker.  Monitoring involves the feedback process where the ramifications of 
decisions are analyzed to identify necessary adjustments to the current procedure. 
 For the purposes of this chapter, emphasis will be placed on identifying which, if 
any, red flags were present in the decision making process of Kennedy and Obama 
during their respective crisis event.  Focusing on identifying the red flags present does 
not mean that neither administration successfully installed safeguards.  Rather, by 
examining the greatest weaknesses present in the Kennedy and Obama transitions, traits 
common to hyper progressive candidates generally may be identified.  Thus, potential 
pitfalls can be marked and 'treated' for future administrations.  While it is certainly 
valuable to recognize what hyper progressive politicians do well, for preventative 





Following the analysis of the respective red flags present in both administrations, 
the two young administrations will be juxtaposed to determine if there were similarities 
between the quantity of each type of red flag present in each crisis event.  In this way, the 
author will determine whether 1. The two young administrations encountered committed 
similar in kind and amount of red flags errors and 2. If there is a similarity present in the 
results, whether this finding might portend for a standard transition experience for future 
hyper progressive candidates moving forward, particularly in regard to the 2016 
presidential contest. 
It is also important to specify the time period that we speak of when we discuss 
the presidential transition.  Per Rebecca Friedman in her article Crisis Management at the 
Dead Center, "As Neustadt writes in Presidential Power, 'A President's transition can be 
defined in two ways, narrowly by the time span between election and augural, broadly by 
the time until he and his principal associates become familiar with the work they have to 
do, including what to ask of one another and what to expect in response'".118Friedman 
chooses to define the term broadly, as will this paper, to encapsulate not only the time in 
which the incoming administration is transition to running the executive branch but to 
also encapsulate the new administration process of learning how to practice the art of 
administrating the Republic.  
 For the purposes of this paper, the ‘transition period’ will be from the day after 
Election Day in November to the time of their first major crisis.  This will effectively 
encapsulate the time in which President-elect Kennedy came to form his opinions on the 




                                                          
 
 
for President-elect Obama, when he and his transition team formulated their baseline 
approach to the brewing financial meltdown through the signing into law of the American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act in February 2009. 
 The methodology of Finkelstein provide a rigorous framework within which we 
can judge how effectively these two politicians handled an early administrative crisis of 
the first order.  It is also intended that by using the same guidelines, we may mitigate the 
bias of examining in the case of Kennedy a foreign policy crisis and for Obama a 
financial one.  By considering the overlying structure of these two presidents’ decision 
making and risk management processes, we can expect to extract a robust and accurate 
assessment of not only how they managed these crises but to what degree each young 
administration adapted to and resolved their respective crisis moment. 
 One final point: in the case of President Kennedy, the scope of his decision 
making fell principally to 1. Who he put into positions of power in his transition team and 
early administration and 2.How he interacted with and handled the government agencies 
in charge of implementing the military operation in Cuba (CIA, CJS).  Conversely, while 
President Obama had faced a similar task in formulating his transition team and 
appointing certain individuals to his administration's economic team, an added wrinkle to 
the passage of ARRA was how his administration interacted with the Congress.  Thus, it 
is acknowledged that the comparison is imperfect; however, Kennedy's handling of the 
government agencies and Obama's handling of the Congress are both excellent gauges of 
their risk management abilities at the outsets of their respective administrations.  
 Finally, it is important to establish that for both crisis examples to be studied in-





background and foundation of the context in which the events occurred generally.  Where 
clarification/ further detail is necessary for the reader to appreciate why the president 
made decisions as he did, detail will be necessarily provided; however, it is not the 
author’s intent to provide a full history of the Bag of Pigs crisis, per se.  Rather, this 
paper intends to highlight the processes and people in place in the administration at the 
time that led to the corresponding decision making and risk management choices that 
were made.   
  i. President Kennedy: The Bay of Pigs 
 The Bay of Pigs crisis ultimately played out as a horror story for the President and 
his administration.  As explained by Finkelstein, “It was a disaster.  The plan had been 
leaked.  The Bay of Pigs was miles from rebel strongholds on the island, and Castro’s 
forces quickly closed in…the lack of U.S. military support allowed the Cuban army to 
overcome the invaders…It was a military catastrophe and a political setback…it was 
clear that even if the plan had not been leaked, the chances of success were minimal.  The 
decision to invade was flawed.”119This synopsis is in sync with the other prominent 
sources that this paper’s research turned up.   
 The story of why President Kennedy failed to have effective decision making and 
risk management apparatus in place early in his administration is the story of the failure 
of his administration to account for and control for the red flags that were present at the 
time of the decision.  In a major way, the lack of experience and information scuttled an 
effective engagement with the government organizations that the President’s advisors had 




                                                          
 
 
 As Kurt Campbell and James Steinberg elucidated in their work Difficult 
Transitions, “the Kennedy administration was forced to make critical decisions before it 
had really settled into office…excessive deference to military and CIA experts, along 
with a lack of knowledge about the national security bureaucracy, in general, contributed 
to insufficient scrutiny by Kennedy and his senior team of advisers.”120  President 
Kennedy was not ready to be Commander in Chief in January 1961 in part because his 
administration was not ready to provide him the critical support services he needed to do 
his job.    
In the case President Kennedy's handling of the Bay of Pigs crisis, one of the 
major flaws often noted in his handling of the crisis was how he perceived the meaning of 
reports from the CIA and Joint Chiefs of Staff.  However, the issues that would dog the 
young president were born even before his first engagement with these agencies.  As 
Friedman describes, "The roots of many challenges that Kennedy later faced with the Bay 
of Pigs invasion can be traced to the miscommunications and information asymmetries 
that occurred between election and inauguration days."121 
 Thus, according to Friedman President Kennedy's Bay of Pigs handling suffered 
principally from a communications failure at its core: communication between advisers 
and the president, a failure of the president to comprehend the bureaucratic lingo of the 
agencies his intelligence reports were originating from, a failure to adequately challenge 
the assumptions made by his advisers and the government agencies that developed the 
120Campbell, Kurt M. and James Steinberg. 2008. Difficult Transitions: Foreign Policy Troubles at the 




                                                          
 
 
logistics for the attack.  Now, these critical communication errors will be evaluated with 
the lens of the red flags to ascertain how the Kennedy transition team did struggle. 
   a. Misleading Prejudgments 
 In the work Difficult Transitions, Kurt Campbell and James Steinberg examine 
the perils that can potentially derail a new administration.  In the case of President 
Kennedy, they made the prescient point that during the campaign for the presidency, 
“Whether the United States faced the prospect of a Soviet numerical advantage in 
strategic nuclear missiles, for example, became a campaign issue…It turned out that the 
“missile gap” was a myth.  Although some argue that Kennedy’s use of this issue was 
simply a political play, there is strong evidence that it was based on a genuine, though 
inaccurate, assessment of the facts.”122 
 Candidate Kennedy had determined in the course of the 1960 presidential 
campaign that not only was the missile gap narrative good for his electoral chances; he 
also came to internalize this assumption entering into the presidency.  Thus, when during 
the Bay of Pigs crisis he had to determine the severity of the threat of the continued 
existence of a Communist Cuba, his presumption of Soviet missile superiority colored his 
decision making towards the Soviet satellite, Castro's Cuba. 
 As well, President Kennedy at his inaugural declared forcefully that the United 
States would “…pay any price, and bear any burden, to defend liberty.”123This statement 
reveals a mindset that was primed to commit to heavy costs to enact what the President 
122Campbell, Kurt M. and James Steinberg. 2008. Difficult Transitions: Foreign Policy Troubles at the 




                                                          
 
 
perceived as necessary change in the global theater.  When coupled with his assumption 
that there truly was a missile gap with the Soviet Union, the President had made a 
dangerous prejudgment that a Communist Cuba combined with an armed-to-the-teeth 
USSR would have to be dealt with forcefully and promptly upon his assumption of the 
presidency. 
 Another damaging prejudgment that the President entered into office with was his 
firm belief that the NSC was a decision making apparatus that would not suit his 
management tastes.  The NSC under President Eisenhower had provided the President 
with an institutional apparatus that "ensure[d] that policy makers dot the most pressing 
'i's' and cross the most important 't's'."124However, Kennedy believed that the NSC was 
simply too bureaucratic and would hamper his ability to make decisions more informally 
with his personal advisers. 
 Therefore, as Frederick Thayer explained in his article "Presidential Policy 
Processes and "New Administration”, "Convinced that the machinery had diluted 
presidential control and determined to make the White House the dominant force in 
foreign policy,  Kennedy also wanted to increase the responsibility of the State 
Department for foreign affairs. ..the statutory NSC remained but was not used."125Thus, 
President Kennedy had entered office with the NSC framed in his mind as a ‘bad’ 
organization that needed to be sidelined from his decision making process. 
 However, as Friedman points out, “The machinery of foreign policy making is too 
124Friedman, 329. 
125 Thayer, Frederick C. 1971. "Presidential Policy Processes and "New Administration": A Search for 
Revised Paradigms." Public Administration Review 31 (5): 555.  
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complex for any incoming president and staff to manage in an informal way…to abolish 
formal structures during the transition is a mistake.”126While Kennedy did not want the 
ossified procedure of the NSC, to remove it before his staff had even begun serving 
resulted in a decision making apparatus to transmit critical information to the president. 
  b. Inappropriate Self-Interest 
 In the case of self-interest, President Kennedy's tantamount interest was that he 
and his Administration maintain plausible deniability as to any U.S. involvement in the 
operation.  As Friedman explained, "He [Kennedy] believed that public exposure of 
American involvement in the exiles' invasion of Cuba would have negative political 
consequences that would counteract his broad goals."127Thus, while Kennedy sought a 
military solution to forcibly remove Fidel Castro from power of Communist Cuba, his 
determination that such an act must not be discovered to have an American connection 
greatly hampered his decision making quality. 
 Indeed, on March 11 1961 the CIA presented to President Kennedy the Trinidad 
Plan for aiding the rebels to overthrow Castro in Cuba.  The President approved the plan 
with modifications.  As Friedman explains, this was a major risk management and 
decision making failure.  The President himself had identified that the "best possible 
plan...had not yet been presented."128Kennedy in part moved forward in spite of knowing 
that Trinidad Plan was not sufficient due to the fact that he had inherited the plan from 
President Eisenhower, the institutional inertia of the CIA, the newness of his staff and 






                                                          
 
 
information asymmetry between the White House and the CIA."129 
 The President was also concerned about his public perception if his 
Administration failed to 'deal with' Cuba in some manner.  As explained by Finkelstein, 
“…there was an element of self-interest in his decision to go ahead with the plan.  While 
he had personal misgivings about the whole enterprise, Kennedy was under domestic 
political pressure to do something about Cuba and was accused by opponents of being 
weak.”130 Ironically, while seeking for the United States to not appear directly involved 
in any military action against Cuba, he certainly felt pressure to project the hawkish 
demeanor he had established to great effect for the presidential campaign.    
   c. Misleading Experiences 
 In the case of the new President Kennedy, the chief executive suffered from 
misleading inexperience going into the Bay of Pigs decision.  As a candidate for 
president, Kennedy received only three briefings from intelligence officials in 1960.  As 
explained by Friedman, “Although the CIA had no clear policy for briefing presidential 
candidates, briefers often omitted highly sensitive covert actions, signal intelligence, and 
human intelligence programs until after the election.”131This paucity of background 
briefings contributed to Kennedy's development of the misleading prejudgment that the 
Soviet missile gap required a firmer American hand in Latin America. 
 Candidate Kennedy was also out-maneuvered tactically by Vice President Nixon 
for the final televised debate the two candidates.  Nixon believed that the Senator had 






                                                          
 
 
an attempt to tie Kennedy, the Vice President in the debate came out against American 
support for the Cuban resistance fighters.  As Friedman explains, “Consequently, 
Kennedy was forced to defend U.S. government support for anti-Castro Cubans on a 
national stage, despite the contradiction…with his repeatedly expressed personal views 
and advisors’ recommendations.”132 
 Had Kennedy had the same information the President Eisenhower was working 
with, he may have come to a more nuanced policy conclusion then to support the 
government in the final Kennedy-Nixon presidential debate.  However, boxed in by 
Nixon, Kennedy went ahead and responded to Nixon’s military right.  The misleading 
inexperience of never having received more in-depth policy briefings from the 
Eisenhower administration meant that Kennedy could not adequately judge whether or 
not supporting President Eisenhower on regime change in Cuba was actually an 
intelligent policy decision for a future Kennedy administration. 
   d. Inappropriate Attachments 
 President Kennedy very much wanted to have a management structure that was 
not ossified to the point of immobility.  However, he went too far in that direction, 
resulting in communication breakdown between his personal advisers and departments 
leads and an overall lack of structure within his administration.  As Thayer explains, 
“Informality within the White House (at least in the Kennedy Years) gave presidential 
assistants an access {to the President} not easily available to Cabinet officers.  As this 




                                                          
 
 
'bilateral' relationships with his advisers, thus reducing overall interaction still further."133 
 Ironically, due to the President’s determination to maintain an informal 
communication network for his administration, he ended up depending much too much 
on the CIA and the Pentagon without rigorously questioning their motives nor 
understanding the terminology used by many of foreign policy organizations he and his 
staff were coordinating with.  As Richard Neustadt explained, even when Kennedy 
attempted to check on the work produced by the CIA, “He was dubious enough about the 
plans he received from the CIA to ask for advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  But he 
evidently was too ignorant to understand that when the military is asked to comment on 
an operation that is someone else’s responsibility it will be loath to open its mind-or its 
mouth.”134Thus, the check that the president sought to deploy was not suited to the task 
of reviewing the CIA’s work.   
Furthermore, the response he and his advisers received from the CJS (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff) was in the lingo of the organization, a lingo that the Kennedy Administration did 
not speak and interpreted at their peril.  As Neustadt narrates, “The Joint Chiefs told him 
that they thought the CIA plan had a ‘fair’ chance of success.  What the colonel who 
wrote those words meant by them was ‘fair’ as next to ‘poor’.  What Mr. Kennedy took 
them to mean was ‘fair’ as next to ‘pretty good’.”135 
Thus, Kennedy’s attachment to his mind’s perceived meaning of ‘fair’ resulted in 
133Thayer, 555. 
134Clinton, W. David and Daniel George Lang. 1993. What Makes a Successful Transition? Papers on 





                                                          
 
 
the president making an incorrect calculation as to the likelihood of success of the Bay of 
Pigs operation.  His advisers failed him as well in not clarifying for him the actual 
meaning of ‘fair’ in military parlance.  The result was an informational breakdown born 
of attachment assumption of meaning. 
  ii. President Obama: The Financial Crisis 
 Put so succinctly by Suskind, "It [ARRA] was something of a hodgepodge, a 
hastily built plan that reflected the competing and unresolved ideas coursing through the 
barely formed administration.”136  However, it was not merely unresolved ideas, but 
ideas committed to too swiftly, without allowing for greater debate within the transition 
team in Chicago on that snowy night.  Yes, the President did call for 'innovation' in that 
first meeting; however, he did not engineer, as did Kennedy later with the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, a deliberative process to compel his advisers to thoroughly vet all the options 
actually available to them to solve the economic meltdown.   
Grunwald revealed that Obama’s detractors were impressed by his efforts in 
securing election: “He [Obama} ran for president with no executive experience beyond 
editing the Harvard Law Review, but even his detractors had to admit his own 
improbable campaign was a well-run operation-disciplined, cohesive, eyes-on-the-
prize."137  Furthermore, the president knew what he wanted to do once he entered into the 
presidential office, per Grunwald: "In private moments during his campaign, Obama 
liked to quote the last line of The Candidate, when the political newcomer played by 





                                                          
 
 
Obama's point was that he didn't intend to be that guy."138  The larger question that 
emerges in Obama’s transition is: what red flags hindered him from actuating his goals? 
Now this paper will explore the process in which President Obama and his 
transition team handled the looming financial crisis of fall 2008.  President-elect Obama 
had a unique and very tricky assignment transitioning to the presidency as pressing 
questions of how to respond to the financial crisis were present even before he assumed 
the office, much like where the Eisenhower Administration had laid the groundwork for 
the Cuban Invasion even before President Kennedy had assumed office.   
 In this way, while both scenarios were different in subject (foreign policy versus 
financial/economic), they both originated under the previous administration's watch and 
thus were inherited by both men immediately upon assumption of their office.  Due to 
this distinction, both men were highly reliant upon their transition teams from the get-go 
to engage their respective crises.  In President Kennedy's case, his main inter-
governmental interactions were with the CIA, JCS, and the Pentagon; for President 
Obama, the Congressional leadership.  However, while they both had to build an 
efficacious response to different institutional stimuli, the common means of evaluation 
via Think Again's red flags will bridge these temporal and coincidental gaps sufficiently 
for analysis. 
   a. Misleading Prejudgments 
 President Obama entering into the crisis had already determined that he would not 
nationalize the banks to resolve the financial meltdown.  This prejudgment can also be 




                                                          
 
 
that Obama had selected for his push to resist the financial meltdown.  These former 
Clintonian economists shared with President Clinton the 'Third Way' Democratic 
thinking that believed in the market to bring prosperity to people. 
 For instance, in their work Accomplished and Embattled: Understanding Obama's 
Presidency, Skocpol and Lawrence R. Jacobs revealed the a startling predisposition of the 
young President's economic team: "“From the start, the new President, a cautious lawyer 
by training, heard key options taken off the table not just by Republicans and 
conservative Democrats in Congress and the Beltway media, but by his own economic 
advisers, who were leery of disrupting existing business practices and hesitant to embrace 
policies outside conventional boundaries.”139 
 Present here are some glaringly obvious prejudgments: the President's top 
advisers would not be entertaining solutions that might alter the existing financial 
framework and they were not looking to explore any ameliorating action that would 
extend beyond established policy prescriptions for an economic crisis.  These 
prejudgments held by the President's chief economic advisers set the stage for a transition 
team that had already committed to a predominant course of action (stimulus response) 
before even delving too deeply into the issue at hand. 
 As well, the Obama transition team had already decided early in its first meeting 
in Chicago in December 16th, 2008 that a major stimulus package was the proper 
response to the worsening financial meltdown.  As described by Ron Suskind in his work 
Confidence Men, “The effectiveness of stimulus spending was still considered the realm 
of unproven economics, but its detractors, in failing to take the ‘multiplier effect’ into 
139Skocpol, Theda and Lawrence R. Jacobs. 2012. "Accomplished and Embattled: Understanding Obama's 
Presidency." Political Science Quarterly (Academy of Political Science) 127 (1): 8. 
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account, appeared to underestimate its value…Inside Team Obama there was almost no 
discussion of whether to undertake a stimulus, just of how large it ought to be.”140 
 Compounding the issue, even when the President and his team during the drafting 
of ARRA determined that some of the stimulus should come from tax breaks for 
Americans, they handled the implementation of this program in a completely ineffectual 
manner on both the policy and political sides.  This political fumble will be explored in 
the misleading experience/ inexperience section of the red flags review.  
   b. Inappropriate Self-Interest 
As Money Well Spent author Michael Grabell lays out, the understaffed Obama 
Administration did not want to risk putting out a bill that was ill-prepared to absorb the 
onslaught of Congressional nitpicking and probing.  So instead, to protect the mystique 
of the Obama Administration, it simply chose to not create a White House stimulus bill.  
As Grabell elucidated one senator’s reaction, “Senator Mel Martinez was struck by the 
lack of involvement from the transition team in crafting the bill...For weeks there 
remained question of whether Obama would put forth his own proposal. But short 
staffed and stretched thin, the transition team had little capacity to create a major piece 
of legislation. Obama’s advisers also rationalized that the bill would get more support if 
members of Congress wrote it themselves."141  This was a gross case of inappropriate 
self-interest: unable or unwilling to produce a bill by itself to help guide the Congress in 
negotiations, instead the White House offered Congress policy pointers and briefings; no 
critical ‘blueprint’ bill to offer effective and firm direction.  





                                                          
 
 
White House, President Obama failed to offer to his Democratic allies in Congress the 
framework with which he hoped to see the stimulus bill enacted.  Had he offered to his 
Democratic allies such a document, they might have been able to warn him of the 
potentially egregious error he would ultimately make of handing the Republicans a 
significant tax break without even forcing them to bargain for it.  This segues nicely to 
the next section of the misleading experience and woeful presence of inexperience that 
permeated the Obama financial crisis.    
c. Misleading Experiences/ Presence of Inexperience 
Similar to the misleading attachments section, Obama had just campaigned 
through the brutal American campaign season on hope and change.  While this tact may 
have helped him secure the White House, the repetitive trope of ‘hope and change’ 
would certainly not necessarily help him and his transition team lock down an 
efficacious response to the worsening financial crisis.   
 In the realm of inexperience lies the atrocious handling of the inclusion of tax cuts 
in ARRA.  As Michael Grabell recounted in his history of the financial crisis Money 
Well Spent, the jejune Obama Administration determined that it would both 1. Install tax 
cuts without even forcing the Republicans to bargain for them, and 2. Spread them thin 
over 2 years, thus significantly reducing the perceivable impact of the cuts on the minds 
of American consumers.  As Grabell writes, “While that might have worked if the tax 
cuts were substantial, congressional Democrats argued that $10 a week wouldn’t be 
enough to counteract the prevailing fear of losing a job, a home, and years of retirement 
savings. The criticism was ultimately proved right. Even the people who did spend the 





consumer sentiment a large check might have provided."142 
 President Obama had campaigned as a reformer politician who would re-energize 
bipartisan feeling in the fractionalized capital.  However, in his eagerness to display 
bipartisan feeling, he unwittingly handed his Republican opponents an opening.  As 
explained by Grunwald, "Republican leaders didn't view Obama's concessions as signs 
they could work with him.  They viewed his concessions as signs they could beat 
him…"143Furthermore, the administration did not heed the advice of Congressional 
Democrats who correctly perceived that stretching out the tax cuts would not result in 
consumers registering their presence nor would they subsequently credit the Democratic 
administration with their existence.   
 As well, Chief of Staff Emanuel perceived the president’s failure to control the 
narrative as a critical tactical error.  “Rahm thought the real communications error was 
putting too many eggs in the bipartisanship basket, and some of his colleagues agreed.  
The president let Republicans control the narrative, because he didn't want to get into a 
partisan brawl, but when the partisan brawl happened anyway, Republican obstructionism 
only seemed to prove that he had failed to change Washington. "144 The President could 
not wish away the partisan nature of Washington, D.C. 
 As Grabell explains, “Obama received no goodwill for the tax cuts, as 
Republicans lambasted the plan as a spending bill that would result in increased taxes 
later. By offering the tax cuts at the outset instead of having Republicans demand them, 
142Grabell, Michael. 2012. Money Well Spent?: The Truth Behind the Trillion Dollar Stimulus, the Biggest 





                                                          
 
 
Obama gave up a critical bargaining chip that might have made the stimulus seem a more 
bipartisan effort."145It was a rookie political error that cost the Administration leverage in 
handling the Republican side of the Congress.   
   d. Misleading Attachments  
 President Obama had built his campaign upon the ideals of hope and change.  
Going into the inferno of delineating how his administration would respond to the 
financial meltdown, Obama remained committed to these campaign ideals, in effect 
determined to be a consensus builder in office.  As Ron Suskind explained in his work 
Confidence Men, describing the scene in his economic transition team’s first meeting on 
the financial crisis“…Obama was surprisingly aloof in the conversation…the president-
elect now seemed disconnected and less than in control of the process.  As the economic 
team hashed out the minutiae of a plan and tried to settle on a number, Obama’s 
contributions were rare.  ‘There needs to be more inspiration here!’ he said at one 
point.”146 
 Thus, the President-elect, when confronted with a problem as numerically 
complex as the financial meltdown, fell back to the trope of ‘original thinking’ in order to 
assuage his strain at dealing with such a combustible situation.  Obama was feeling the 
heat from having an inappropriate attachment to the rhetorical invention of his successful 
presidential campaign, that of the transformational president who rode into Washington 
to save the Union.  As elation turned to reality, the President was certainly feeling the 
145Grabell, 66. 
146Suskind, Ron and James Lurie. 2011. Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington, and the Education of a 
President Harper New York: 154. 
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pressure already to deliver on the promise he had so stunningly sold to the nation. 
 Further, President Obama harbored an attachment to his chief economic advisers, 
Geithner and Summers, born not necessarily of necessity but of shared disposition.  Per 
Grunwald, "...Obama felt comfortable with technocratic elites like Summers and 
Geithner.  He was one of them.  He also felt comfortable with their brand of market-
oriented centrism.  It was another thing they had in common."147Thus, while Obama 
desired a more progressive bent concerning infrastructure improvements, his gravitation 
towards advisers more attuned to his 'technocratic' mindset resulted in advisers who did 
not see eye to eye with him on stimulus infrastructure projects. 
 Indeed, as the Progressives of the Obama campaign team were frozen out of top 
administration positions, the joke spread among Obama’s supporters that while Obama 
won the White House, Hillary Clinton’s staff received the plum jobs.148  However, with 
the selection of Clinton-era supporters with stimulus goals diverging from the president’s, 
Obama found his message undercut and even appropriated by Republicans in their efforts 
to undermine the stimulus.  As Grunwald elucidates, “They {Republicans} quoted 
Summers about poorly designed stimulus, Orszag about the slow pace of public works, 
Romer about the power of tax cuts."149  All three, Summers, Orszag, and Romer, were 
top Obama economic advisers who did not stay ‘on message’ for the president’s stimulus.  
Due to his attachment to them all, he paid a heavy political cost. 
 As Suskind reveals on that first transition team meeting to explore the financial 






                                                          
 
 
somehow deliver on the high rhetoric of his campaign, but it was taken aback all the 
same by how out of place the comment seemed in the middle of a discussion of 
quantifiable outcomes.”150Obama allowed his attachment to ‘the big picture’ to cloud his 
judgment as to how the crisis should be dealt with: with hard numbers and a concrete 
action plan.   
III. Conclusion 
  A. What This Says About Hyper Progressive Candidates Turned President? 
One clear takeaway from President Kennedy’s experience from the Bay of Pigs is 
that elite presidential campaigns do not automatically translate into sleek transition teams.  
President Kennedy did not have a decision making structure in place from day 1 to 
adequately weigh the scales for the Bay of Pigs decision and he certainly did not have a 
risk management structure in place to identify the inherently destructive duality of having 
two diverging goals (the removal of Castro coupled with plausible deniability of U.S. 
involvement). 
In both the cases of the young Presidents were railroaded by more experienced 
actors; President Kennedy deferred to the point of acquiescence concerning the CIA; for 
President Obama, Secretary Geithner and Director Larry Summers steered the ship firmly 
away from the industry-seeding enterprise the president had originally envisioned.  
Indeed, when Obama was later given the opportunity to meet with the Progressive 
economists, he displayed great curiosity and interest in their work.151Like Kennedy, 
Obama had learned from the first great crisis of his administration the mistake of relying 





                                                          
 
 
 Thus, a common characteristic of a hyper progressive young gun who captures the 
presidency is the ironic tendency to defer to their policy superiors at the outset of their 
administration when they are faced with their premier severe crisis. It was by marketing 
themselves as capable and 'ready to lead from day one' that these relatively young 
politicians were able to convince voters to choose them over their more experienced 
political rivals in the campaigns leading to the Oval Office.  However, once they assume 
the Presidency and are met with their first true crisis, both men reacted in a similar vein: 
half-hearted and unfocused efforts to seek balance in their Administration's response 
while ultimately electing to commit to the establishment policy prescription.   
 Why did both President Kennedy and Obama do this?  Going further from the 
paper's introduction, it would appear that young gun politicians who have poured so 
much into winning high stakes elections may have not fully honed the management chops 
necessary to respond to a true crisis from the get-go.  Such thoughts first gripped 
President-elect Obama's economic transition team in their first meeting following his 
election152.While Kennedy and Obama succeeded in constructing an impressive political 
brand and fashioned around them a team for achieving presidential contest victories; the 
requisite skill set, while formidable, apparently does not instantly translate into the same 
skill set necessitated in being president during a crisis. 
 Of course, a counterargument to hyper progressive presidents struggling with 
their first crisis would be that all new presidents will suffer a steep learning curve.  
Certainly any individual and their transition team, regardless of whether they were a 




                                                          
 
 
green around the edges when it came the use of their presidential prerogative.  What is so 
striking about Kennedy and Obama was that they were in contrast so decisive on the 
campaign trail.  When juxtaposed with their handling of their first great crisis, it would 
seem that somewhere from the heat of the campaign onto their first crisis, their 
impressive élan deserted them.   
 Or perhaps it is more a question of their similar professional preparations for the 
job.  As then-both Senators Johnson and Clinton would attest, then-Senators Kennedy 
and Obama were legislative pipsqueaks, offering up paltry bits of legislation while they 
served for short stints in the United States Senate.  Indeed, neither man held a managerial 
or leadership role while serving in the Senate (outside of managing their own senatorial 
office, of course).  It would seem that this in part would explain why Presidents Kennedy 
and Obama, while full of confidence and eager to win the White House, upon 
encountering their first true test of leadership, would, having never been battle-hardened 
as governors or Senate leaders would have been tested, would seek the succor and 
apparent ‘safety’ of expert opinion in the CIA or establishment economic advisers. 
 B. Similar Errors, Different Results 
 The question of the quality of the end result cannot be ignored.  Per Friedman, 
President Kennedy's Bay of Pigs catastrophe has no peer among foreign policy failures 
during a presidential transition since 1961.153  For President Obama's work in passing and 
signing ARRA into law, the record is much more favorable.  Many economists consider 
the Stimulus as instrumental in preventing the US economy from falling into another 




                                                          
 
 
 While President Obama floundered in his intervention efforts during his transition 
team's first economic meeting to inject more innovation into the stimulus' rollout, Obama 
did select the steady hands who understood the existing financial system to frame the 
White House's Stimulus proposal to the Congress.  In contrast, President Kennedy 
shattered the existing NSC decision making structure soon after taking office, and instead 
relied on untested and unprepared advisers to guide him in evaluating the invasion plans 
constructed by the CIA, as well as the evaluations of those plans performed by the 
Pentagon.   
 Thus, while both men brought their share of red flags into both equations, 
principally that of misleading inexperience, President Obama was fortunate in that he 
installed capable and experienced hands in positions of significant power so that they 
could efficaciously frame the resulting legislative proposals to the Congress, thus setting 
the tone for the bill's crafting in the legislature.  In juxtaposition, in the Kennedy 
Administration no foreign policy steady hand was designated by the President to frame a 
cohesive approach to the entire process of implementation and execution. 
 Their actions in the critical area of developing a robust decision making apparatus 
differed.  President Obama did not disassemble the existing economic decision making 
system, whereas President Kennedy did extricate the NSC from day to day operations.  
Where President Obama did install tried hands at key positions in his financial 
Administration, President Kennedy relied on government neophytes for counsel.  Thus, 
while both young senators-turned-president were hampered by inexperience, it was 
Kennedy's choosing to dismantle the existing risk management structure at the genesis of 





the Bay of Pigs crisis. 
 From the perspective of Christensen’s goals model, Obama was more successful 
in the end as his two goals were not in conflict.  Obama could avoid a depression yet fail 
to seed innovative industry.  For Kennedy, however, attempting to maintain plausible 
deniability sabotaged his efforts to remove Castro from power, and doomed the rebels to 
capture and death.  That Kennedy and his advisers failed to grasp 1. That the two goals 
were in conflict and 2. That plausible deniability had already failed as the press was 
already aware of U.S. efforts to remove Castro explains why Obama and Kennedy 
experienced such drastic divergence in success level. 
 C. The Hyper Progressive President in Action 
 Both young gun hyper progressive politicians began the presidency with a paucity 
of executive experience.  Both had served in legislatures rather than governor's mansions 
prior to ascending to the presidency.  As well, in the United States Senate neither man 
took on a major leadership role (in part due to the fact that seniority often dictates who is 
in a position of leadership in that body).  Thus, ironically what had served them so 
excellently in the presidential campaign (a thin resume with a limited voting record) 
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Based upon the findings from previous chapters it will be posited what kind of a 
presidency might emerge from the electoral success of a hyper progressive politician in 
2016.  Currently, a slew of freshman senators e.g. Rubio, Paul, Cruz, and Warren, have 
been noted by political operatives as potential candidates for the presidency in 2016.  
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine which of these freshman senators 
might be classifiable as a hyper progressive politician, if one were to emerge as such and 
ultimately capture the presidency, knowledge of how past hyper progressive politicians-
turned-presidents had managed their transitions would prove invaluable in formulating a 
risk management strategy that sought to mitigate the potentiality for costly errors as was 
experienced by President Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs crisis. 
The worst red flag condition identified in Chapter III was that of misleading 
inexperience.  Neither Kennedy nor Obama entered the Oval Office with a surfeit of 
managerial experience; indeed, Obama himself acknowledged when transitioning from a 
State Senator of Illinois to U.S. Senator from Illinois that he needed help in setting up his 
Senate offices.  As Obama explained to Pete Rouse, Senator Daschle’s former chief of 
staff, “…I don’t know how to build a large staff and negotiate the potential pitfalls of 
being a relatively high-profile newcomer to the Senate.”154  As Obama had precious little 
time between becoming a Senator and then beginning his run for the presidency, most of 
his managerial experience would have to be built on the presidential campaign trail. 
For President Kennedy, his naiveté in believing he could just extricate the NSC as 
an established risk management apparatus from the existing presidential framework and 
154Suskind, Ron and James Lurie. 2011. Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington, and the Education of a 
President Harper New York: 50. 
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still maintain an effective procedure for decision making while containing risk was 
shocking.  Kennedy’s presumption that such an extreme organizational re-shifting 
without a corresponding safeguard being installed reveals a man who had never managed 
risk in a truly significant manner. 
This returns to the crux of why hyper progressive candidates are inherently 
prepared to win the presidency but in danger of disappointment upon assuming the role; 
in seeking to escape their current political office rapidly to progress to the next higher 
office (a la Kennedy and Obama bolting the Senate for the Presidency), they neglect to 
cultivate the requisite leadership, risk management, and decision making skills that the 
office of the Presidency demands to be successful from Day 1.   
Due to this common lack of experience established in Chapter III, Presidents 
Kennedy and Obama were particularly susceptible to falling prey to assumptions and 
misinformation or misinterpretation of presented information.  As well, neither young 
president knew when he needed to ‘push back’ against information offered up as gospel 
by the government agency they were interacting with (Kennedy) or their economic policy 
team (Obama).  Both Kennedy and Obama knew exactly what they wanted to actuate in 
office; the issue arose in them not knowing how to make that change occur once they 
entered into office. 
Again, it needs to be reiterated that in the two examples explored in Chapter III, 
Kennedy and Obama’s respective crises are popularly considered to have had drastically 
different levels of success.  For Kennedy, the Bay of Pigs is considered near-universally 
as a foreign policy fiasco of the highest order.  For Obama and the selling and passage of 





to have averted another depression, irrespective of debates as to whether the stimulus too 
large or too small in dollar amount.  However, what is significant in this analysis is not 
whether the end result of the president’s decision was positive or negative, but rather to 
examine the quality of risk management and informed decision making made by the 
president to arrive at the decisions they arrived at. 
Safeguards 
 
 As Presidents Kennedy and Obama both displayed significant misleading 
inexperience in their handling of their respective crises, it behooves this paper to explore 
what corresponding safeguards may have helped mitigate the inexperience of both men.   
Kennedy: Having removed governance (NSC), Kennedy left himself and his decision 
making structure at risk because he removed that risk management 
apparatus. Governance was thus a vital safeguard lacking presence in the early Kennedy 
White House.  Later, after having gained the hard-won safeguard of experience, Kennedy 
amped up the ‘debate and challenge’ safeguard via ExComm. 
 The following are the safeguards identified by the author after considering what 
preparations may have assisted President Kennedy in avoiding the pitfalls that he 







Kennedy Safeguards to Counteract (Via the Safeguard Database):155 
1. Experience, Data, and Analysis  
A. "Expose decision maker to new experiences" 
i. Ex. Share information about Pentagon/ CIA lingo on a  
 regular basis 
ii. “Increase the flow of real-time information”: e.g., do not  have 
 the president dependent upon one government agency ex. The CIA 
 for relevant information. 
 B. Do Analysis of key assumptions 
i. “Do extra modules of analysis of key areas of uncertainty, 
 particularly where experience about these uncertainties is limited” 
 a. In the case of Kennedy, his ignorance of CIA and  
  military lingo resulted in him making decisions based upon  
  incorrect assumptions. 
ii.”Pressure test the proposed solution-e.g., add 25% to the 
 downside case”: the Kennedy team was so focused on 
 maintaining deniability for the Administration that it failed  to 
 accurately note the tremendous downside of  failure. 
2. Group Debate and Challenge 
A. “Add new members who have different viewpoints” 
i. “Increase the communication to and from the decision group to 
increase the diversity of viewpoints and consequent challenge.”   
a. The Secretary of State Rusk wanted to inform the 
president of his reservations but feared it was not his 
place to become involved in a military/ Defense 
Department operation.   
ii. “Add the implementer to the decision group” 
155Finkelstein, Sydney, Jo Whitehead, and Andrew Campbell. 2013. Think again: Why Good Leaders make 
Bad Decisions and how to Keep it from Happening to You Harvard Business Press: Appendix II. 
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b. President Kennedy would become more directly 
involved with Ex. Comm. During the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.   
3. Governance 
A.  ”Review and modify the overall decision process” 
   i.“Advise on, or ask for a report on, the decision group and 
process used” 
 a. More pertinent information to Kennedy would have 
 made much more sense. 
  
 Obama: President-elect Obama was involved in the first economics debate to map out an 
approach to the crisis, but did not manage it well.  He lacked the experience to navigate 
the discussion towards his desired outcome (innovation, creativity) in handling the 
debate.  As well, with Summers already established as a heavy in his administration’s 
brain trust, Obama had installed an individual very set in his ways; would be hard to 
overcome the Clintonian thinking of that time.  Of course, Summers also brought with 
him invaluable experience.   
Obama Safeguards to Counteract (Via the Safeguard Database):156 
I. Experience, Data, and Analysis 
 A. “Do Analysis of Key Assumptions” 
  i. “Focus analysis on specific elements of the classical decision  
   process-e.g., create alternative frames for the problem, lay out the  
   link between the frame and criteria, identify potential options,  
   discuss the key assumptions, create detailed implementation” 
   a. This is where Obama, in his effort to move beyond ‘just’  
    a traditional stimulus bill, was not able to lead.  There was  
    not a procedure in place before his first financial crisis  
    meeting as President-elect to steer the proceedings towards  
156Finkelstein, Sydney, Jo Whitehead, and Andrew Campbell. 2013. Think again: Why Good Leaders make 
Bad Decisions and how to Keep it from Happening to You Harvard Business Press: Appendix II. 
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    framing the issue and  attempting to corral assumptions as  
    to how to best resolve the crisis. 
II. Group Debate and Challenge 
 A. “Add new members who have different viewpoints” 
  i. “Add people with different personal interests and/or emotional  
   tags-e.g., skeptical generalists…” 
   a. This is where Obama went too far one way.  Believing  
    that experts who understood the system were the only ones  
    who could fix it, he went too far in that direction, locking  
    out many of the progressive economists and financiers who 
    had expected a seat at the table for the construction of the  
    stimulus.  Having assured their presence at the table would  
    have offered the President a mouthpiece for his sentiments  
    for greater imagination and innovation.   
 B. "Design the decision process to encourage conflict between people with 
  different viewpoints" 
  i. "Have a session to identify new frames, options, criteria" 
   a. Obama did do this...in April 2009, after the stimulus bill  
    was already signed into law.157  Had he included the exiled  
    progressive wing of the Democratic Party more from  
    design, these insights would have been harvested then. 
III. Governance 
 A. "Add an individual with different emotional connections-e.g., different  
   prejudgments, no attachments to the status quo" 
  i. Again with the exiled progressive economics wing: Obama  
   selected Clinton men to staff his top finance and economics jobs in 
   his administration.  There was a failure to attain balance in   
   perspective. 
 B. "Strengthen the governance process to add challenge" 
  i. "Increase the time spent debating aspects of the decision-e.g.,  




                                                          
 
 
   a. Again, this approach would have opened the door to  
    greater reflection as to how to add the 'inspiration' bit that  




 Both presidents could have benefited from the presence of safeguards from the 
experience, group debate and challenge, and governance categories.  There was variation 
within each of these categories however.  These variations can be explained due to the 
varying nature of their respective crises.   
 Concerning Experience, both men would have profited from doing an analysis of 
their key assumptions.  However, whereas President Kennedy needed to become more 
proficient in the operational semantics of his military, President Obama needed to 
“…create alternative frames for the problem… ” e.g., there should have been a discussion 
structure that would have encouraged opposing viewpoints in his economic meetings, not 
silenced a president calling for inspiration.   
 This difference in emphasis in exploring their key assumptions existed because 
Obama was proficient in economic lingo and desired a helping hand to guide him to an 
inspirational, consensus-built solution, whereas Kennedy was struggling simply to 
comprehend the terminology being employed by the military.  President Obama did not 
require the clarification of facts insomuch as he needed an advocate for alternative paths 
for potential exploration. 
 Concerning Group Debate and Challenge, both men should have added new 
people who had perspectives differing from those already in their administration.  For 





him probe and resist military advice and assumption; for Obama, his understanding of the 
financial crisis was fundamentally stymied by the absence of the progressive economic 
wing in the White House.   
 For President Kennedy, the necessity was in expanding the depth of experience.  
As well, Kennedy would later insert himself more forcefully into the decision making 
process during the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  This sort of strident 
presidential leadership and authority would have been very salutary earlier in his 
administration. 
 For President Obama, greater emphasis would have been better-placed in stirring 
conflict among his advisers.  While there was healthy, vociferous debate concerning the 
size of the proposed stimulus, the size range was never expanded to include what the 
progressives considered necessary to fill the economic hole in the economy.   
 In Governance, Kennedy’s greatest weakness was the lack of a risk management 
and decision making structure set in place.  The dismantling of the NSC had taken care of 
that.  For Obama, it came back to the lack of the progressive presence in his 
administration in top positions of power.  When the President did have Paul Krugman 
and others to the White House in April of 2009, months after ARRA had been signed into 
law, his thoughts on zero interest spurring borrowing, ensnared the president in “rapt 
fascination”.158 
Discovered Leadership Strengths and Weaknesses of the Hyper Progressive 
Politician 




                                                          
 
 
office.  Their message is powerful, inspiring, and inclusive.  Their goals for their 
respective administration, while often vague, are also often lofty and ambitious (fitting).  
The public that elected them to higher office is often rewarded for their votes with 
inspiring rhetoric and intentions that reinforce their desire to be inspired and included by 
the hyper progressive candidate. 
 Of course, there are two sides to this inspirational coin: this vagueness and 
inclusiveness message can result in a leader adrift; in their establishment of policy 
priorities some of their voluminous constituency inevitably feel betrayed by the leader’s 
failure to take on their issue of choice.   
 As well, hyper progressive politicians, as they progressed through subsequent 
offices without having the time to cultivating the legislative and executive skill sets 
needed to be an effective leader, are often simply unprepared to take on the duties of the 
office they have been elected to.  Thus, ironically they lack the very skill set required to 
actuate the lofty goals they have promised to the electorate that put them in their position 
of power in the first place.   
What Type of Experience, Then, Should Voters Look for in their Candidates? 
Concerning legislative/ senatorial experience: voters tend not to take to long-
serving U.S. senators because at some point these time-tested senators have surely voted 
for something that the voters find reprehensible.  Ironically, the legislative experience 
that these senators have accrued would be very useful to a president.  Of course, as 
legislators and not executives, senators may still be lacking in managerial authority.   
 The author believes that both experienced senators and governors are excellent 





U.S. state, they are more directly positioned to have the relevant managerial and 
executive experience to succeed in the Oval Office from day one.  However, the 
institutional knowledge of a long-serving senator is invaluable to a president that would 
seek to shepherd tendentious legislation through the U.S. Congress.   
The Future Looks Bright for Hyper Progressive Politicians 
Disruptive innovations present greater opportunities for HPP candidates, who 
excel at taking advantage of such changes.  Coincidentally, the Post-World War II 
American political era has been one of rapidly advancing communications technology 
breakthroughs.  As technology as a communication tool has rapidly expanded and 
evolved, HPP have experienced a correlated surge in their electoral chances as they have 
a higher frequency of disruptive innovations to take decisive advantage of. Thus, we as 
an electorate should expect to see a greater frequency of successful HPP candidates 
entering into the political arena. 
Preparing for Future Hyper Progressive Candidates-turned-President 
 In 2016, a new president may also be a young, super-ambitious senator.  If a new 
hyper progressive candidate is confirmed into the office of the presidency, it is relevant to 
wonder what kind of leader they may turn out to be in office.  Synthesizing from this 
paper’s findings, this new president will 1. Know generally what they hope to accomplish 
in office, but 2. Will not have accrued the necessary experience and connections to get it 
done. 
 However, they will have been stellar campaigners, having inspired the American 
people to elect them to the highest office in the land.  They will have, as Presidents 





great rhetoric and ideas do not translate alone into great presidencies.  To profit from the 
lessons of this paper and thus from the past experience of the Kennedy and Obama 
transitions and early administrations, new hyper progressive candidates must first 
maintain existing decision making and risk management structures.  While every new 
president wishes to put their own personal imprimatur upon the office, all new presidents 
are inherently inexperienced in the role of president early-on, none more so than a hyper 
progressive candidate, who achieved the office at a younger age and thus likely has not 
had the experience to master certain leadership skills. 
 Secondly, whatever crisis may emerge early in a president’s term of office, they 
must be sure to both 1. Appoint advisers from a variety of different schools of thought 
e.g., not Clintonian economists only, and 2. They must avoid bringing predominately 
inexperienced hands into the advisory ranks (the hyper progressive president themselves 
is already lacking in government experience).  By adhering to these transition guidelines, 
the next hyper progressive candidate-turned-president may hope to have installed 
satisfactory safeguards against the potential pitfalls of the hyper progressive candidate.  
By controlling for their inexperience, the hyper progressive president may effectively 










Appendix: Data Visualization 
Source: McCoy, Paul M. H. "Presidential Age of Ascendance, Presidents Truman-Obama". 
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